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California Museum of Science & 
Building - Muses Room 
700 State Drive, Exposition Park 
Los Angeles, California 
October 27, 1980 
CHAiffi1AN JACK R. FENTON: The subject of 
the statute of l1mitations in civil conspiracies. 
's hearing is 
Statutes of limitations are the within which 
lawsuits may be filed. are intended to protect persons from 
having to defend against suits based on events that are so old that 
important evidence and witnesses may no longer be available. 
In Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., the California Supreme Court 
held that when two or more persons carry out an unlawful scheme to 
harm another person, the statute of limitations does not begin to run 
until the last overt act in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy 
has been completed. 
Today, the Committee will receive testimony on whether the 
Legislature should make any changes in this "last overt act" rule. 
TAle will examine whether that rule is necessary in order to protect 
victims of conspiracies without unfairly burdening defendants in such 
cases. 
Our first witness is Brian Van Camp. How are you Brian? 
MR. BRIAN VAN CAMP: Just fine, Hr. Chairman, thank you. 
l'1r. Chairman, I'm appearing today on behalf of Union Home Loan Mortgage 
Company. And as you suggested we are here to present testimony on 
what is basically the continuation of the McVittie bill, which was 
heard by this body and actually passed by this Committee in the 
Assembly in the last session. It was defeated, however, on the 
Senate side on what we perceive to be basical a ob-
jection, that is in the minds of the Senators the wrongful joinder 
that act or that bill with another bill related but not right on 
the same subject. 
The , in our humble view, not whether mortgage 
loan brokers done anything wrong in the past. The fact 
, when I was Commissioner of Corporations I was disturbed by re-
ports of some of the problems in that try but I'm firmly con-
vinced that through the deliberations of this Committee, the Assembly 
and the Legislature, many, if not all,of those abuses, have been ad-
dressed from a legislative standpoint and are behind us, and not the 
subject of today's hearing. Nor is this an attempt to reargue the Wyatt 
case, which in our view, was a case of bad facts making bad law. That 
case at the trial level was not taken seriously and the facts were not 
put in contention,and when the jury awarded judgment for the plaintiffs 
the appellate courts were pretty well stuck with the facts as they were 
deduced at trial which was basically without opposition from the defend-
ants. Rather this is an attempt to balance the imate needs of the 
plaintiffs to get to have time, first of all, to discover the wrong 
done to them and then to proceed in an orderly fashion to prepare a 
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case and file it against the defendants. This is an attempt to balance 
that very legitimate right with the legitimate needs of the potential 
defendants to have their claims adjudicated before key witnesses die 
or disappear and before records are lost or destroyed. Largely, in 
the past, this has been a balanc which has been the subject of well 
argued debate before the islative committees and has generally re-
sulted in well reasoned rules balancing these critical needs against 
each other. 
Recently, however, as you have said, the statute of limi-
tations concerning tort actions has been substantially modified 
by several appeLlate courts in California in a way whlch substanti-
ally broadens the for potential plaintif to br suit 
in the civil tort area. case law now states that if it is 
alleged and proven that two or more persons have conspired to commit a 
tort, then the statute o limitations does not begin to run or is,in 
fact, tolled until the commission of the so-called last overt act by 
the defendants. This rule has been applied regardless of the time of 
discovery of the commission of the actions constituting the original 
tort. And then, read the cases, the last overt act apparently may 
include virtually business dealings between the claimant 
and the alleged de s following the original tortious conduct in-
cluding the mere of loan repayments at any time after the 
original loan had been entered , assuming two or more persons had 
conspired to make the loan improperly. 
We believe the hol in the and similar cases pre-
sents two basic irst is pla ffs who are 
alleged to have been defrauded more than one person enjoy a longer 
per of time within which to file their , even given identical 
injuries than another intiff who was only one person. 
The second problem, we be led last overt act 
doctrine which revives, extent, torts 
which running 
of the icable statute first objec-
tion, the judicial cases do s any for holding 
open the time for fil in cases where more tortfeasor 
had part ipated to cause ury to a person as opposed to cases where 
the injury is only caused one person. Further, the context of 
commercial transact s lrnost any tort feasor can be said 




, the is liable tortious conduct of its 
able to 
j ially created 






ever, the courts 
from the bare 
their other act 
if the conduct was incurred within the scope 
the ff lly going to 
as a defendant. The new 
therefore extends the time 
set down for br the 
would now start to run 
after the last overt act. 
of the statute of limi-
overt act, however, is justi-
arose. There 
In the c 1 law cases, how-
that no civil liability arises 
to act unlawful , independent of 
a c iracy al ion is 
to joinder as defendants of all parties to the tort regardl~ss 
of whether they actually participated in the commission of that tort. 
The statute of limitations in cases invol civil conspiracies is 
that period specified for actions based upon the underlying wrongful 
o nduct which was the actual subject of the conspiracy. 
Again the commercial banking and lending areas, the 
Supreme Court's new doctrine is carried to an unreasonable extent. 
The last overt act constituting the fraudulent loan transaction there 
was a mere acceptance of loan payments made over the course of the 
time of the repayment of the loan. The reasonable application of this 
rule could well extend the time within which to bring their actions. 
CHAiffi1AN FENTON: Let me interrupt you one minute, Brian, 
so I can introduce Assemblymen Art Torres from Los Angeles, Dave 
Stirling from Whittier and Willie Brown from San Francisco. 
MR. VAN CAMP: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We believe that the 
natural extension of the Wyatt holding would keep alive actions for up-
wards of decades. Assume that a 30 year loan had been made under im-
proper circumstances at the outset. Under such circumstances and the 
new rule, the time for bringing that action would be three years past 
the final payment of that loan, possibly 33 years after the loan had 
been made. The natural consequences of that would be a difficulty in 
trying the case as well as an enlargement of the damages, usually the 
longer the time runs since the occurrence of the problem, the higher 
the damages. It allows the potential plaintiff to sit in the weeds 
and wait for further overt acts, largely controlled by himself in mak-
ing the repayments and expand the damages and largely diminish the 
capability of the defendants to adequately try the case. 
Viewed in the context of even non-commercial transactions, 
however, the last overt act doctrine creates similarly anomalous re-
sults. In the libel and slander area, for instance, if the plaintiff 
can find at least one publication or statement of a defamatory nature 
within the statutory period he can use that statement to revive and 
make actionable any previous libelous or slanderous remarks made by 
the same persons regardless of time at which such previous statements 
were made, and regardless of the fact that the plaintiff had known all 
along of such earlier statements. Since the courts have held that the 
knowledge or discovery of alleged tortious conduct has no bearing on 
the tolling of the statute of limitations as long as the last overt 
act has not been completed, this doctrine bears no relationship to 
other cases where the law tolls the running of statutes of limitations 
for what we believe are good causes. Thus, if after the commission 
of the tort a defendant conceals the fact of the wrongdoing from the 
plaintiff, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 
plaintiff actually discovers or should reasonably have discovered the 
fact of the wrongdoing. 
Similarly, if the plaintiff is in a relationship with the 
defendant, where the defendant is pledged to guard the best interests 
of the plaintiff, then the statute of limitations, again, reasonably 
does not begin to run during the continuation of that relationship. 
Thus, persons who are under the care of a physician, an attorney, a 
guardian, a trustee or other similar fiduciaries do not have the 
statute of limitations running against them for as long as such persons 
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continue in that relationship of protection or care from the defendant 
absent the actual or constructive discovery of the wrongful act. 
In ordinary business transactions, however, absent a special 
showing, all parties are presumed to be on an equal footing and do not 
need the additional assistance which the last overt act doctrine con-
fers upon them. Again, in the lending arena,once the loan is made 
and the facts constituting its illegality are discovered, then pre-
sumably the borrower is in no worse position than any other plaintiff 
who has discovered the commission of the wrongful acts against him, 
and the new law should encourage him to reduce his claim to an action 
brought against the defendants within a reasonable time. This we be-
lieve the Legislature in the past has encouraged, but the courts have 
discouraged with their recent pronouncements. 
For the above reasons, the Legislature,in our view, should 
act with all deliberate speed to preserve the integrity of its pre-
viously enunciated policies governing the filing of actions to 
maintain the delicate balance between the rights of plaintiffs to seek 
redress for wrongful actions, and the rights of defendants to bring 
forth clear evidence pertaining to such allegations. More specific-
ally, the Legislature should, in our view, amend the Code of Civil 
Procedure to make it clear that once the tortious conduct has been 
covered, the statute of limitations should commence to run regard-
less of either the number of tortfeasors who have committed the wrong-
ful actions or the later occurrence of so-called overt acts. If such 
acts occur they will certainly also be actionable, but such acts should 
not of themselves operate to extend the life of lawsuits cit earl 
conduct by the tortfeasor which would otherwise be barred by the ordi-
nary running of the stature of limitations. The islature should 
make it clear that such broad claims do not suddently spring to life 
because of the corr@ission of new wrongful acts. Further, the Legis-
ature should address so-called civil racy and con-
f that not suffic to toll the of the statute f 
1 on claims which would otherwise be barred. Once the 
claimant has d covered the alleged wrong, ,a claim be filed on 
a timely bas regardless of the number of persons alleged to be in-
volved in its perpetrat Finally, giving redress to this area 
of the law, we cannot and do not urge that any revision the 
law be made retroactively. Lawsuits are currently work their way 
through the courts on the basis of the rulings handed down in 
and others. Such lawsuits, in our view, should not and 
verse affected any legislation which this Committee would consider 
in the sess of the islature. In addition, the Legisla-
t~re should probably that actions may still be maintained under 
the doctrine through, say, June 30, 1982. 
We apprec the considerat of the Committee to this 
urgent problem in our view has done violence to the delicate 
balance between the justif needs of both plaintiffs and defend-
ants, especial the co~mercial area. The needs of business 
and others in this state to be able to an their affairs and avoid 
the necess of defend claims re not capable of de-
termination on the basis of current information or with the assistance 
of witnesses who can adequately recall all pertinent events, makes 
this suggested amendment for considered de iberation. 
you for your time considerat 
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CHAiffi1AN FENTON: Thank you very much. Edwin Preston. 
MR. EDWIN PRESTON: I am Edwin Preston, a lawyer from Los 
A~geles. I'm 1n private practice. I am not appear on behalf of 
a y specific client although our office would tend to represent clients 
that would have the same interests in legislation as Mr. Van Camp. A 
civil conspiracy,as Mr. van Camp mentioned, is not a tort as contrasted 
with a criminal conspiracy. As Wyatt has correctly pointed out, it im-
plicates all who agree to a plan to commit a wrong, and tacit consent 
is enough to bring someone within the gambit of a conspiracy. Thus, 
a conspiracy is nothing more than a method of creating a joing li-
ability for defendants who did not actually directly participate in 
the wrongful act or for defendants who are only slightly culpable as 
compared with the culpability of the principal actor. The rule as it 
presently exists in California developed from the Schessler v. Keck 
case where the court of appeal applied the criminal law conspiracy to 
a civil conspiracy based on an argument made by the plaintiff's counsel 
that a criminal conspiracy rule should apply and the defendant's 
counsel's incorrect concession that that was the applicable rule. 
So the line of cases in California developed from a mistake by de-
fendant's counsel in failing to cite the Bowman v. Wohlke decision 
which is discussed both in Chief Justice Bird's opinion in Wyatt and 
by Justice Richardson's concurrence in Wyatt. 
It's my view that Bowman properly applies the civil con-
spiracy rule and the statute of limitations the way it ought to be 
applied. The reason I say that, aside from questions of freshness of 
evidence and the things that Mr. Van Camp principally referred to, is 
that the rule doesn't make sense. To give an example of why I contend 
that the rule doesn't make sense, I'm going to draw from a case that 
was somewhat a companion case to the Wyatt case. I was counsel for 
certain of the defendants in the case Pardee v. United States Power 
Squadrons which was decided by the court of appeal in Los Angeles. 
The Supreme Court granted a hearing in that case while Wyatt was pend-
ing. After the Wyatt decision had been decided, that's pr1or to argu-
ment of my case, the Supreme Court retransferred the case to the court 
of appeal for a modification of the opinion to include reference to 
Wyatt. As I think I mentioned the Pardee case is not published. I 
should also mention that the Pardee case is dismissed and settled so 
that the parties there no longer have any particular interest in where 
the rule goes. I should also point out I'm going to use some of the 
names out of the Pardee case for convenience, it shouldn't be taken 
as a suggestion by me that any of the wrongful conduct was actually 
carried out. We'll treat is as a hypothetical. 
The case was for the tort of interference with business ad-
vantage or for inducing breach of contract. And, according to the 
plaintiff, the tort was carried out by one of the defendants, Mr. 
Hutchings, in November of 1971 by causing action to terminate the 
plaintiff's contract with another. The notice of the termination was 
mailed to the plaintiff, and let's assume that that notice was mailed 
by Mr. Quint who was also a defendant, and let's assume that Mr. Quint 
aqreed with Hr. Hutchings' action, although Hr. Quint didn't take the 
action, all he did was take the letter to the post office. Under the 
rule of Wvatt and prior cases, Mr. Quint can be held as a conspirator 
in the tort of inducinq the breach of this contract. Let's assume 
that the old contract ends in February of 1972, that is about three 
months after the action was taken, and that a new contract with an 
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outsider, Hr. , is made in Barch of 1972. Now you have an action 
filed in March of 1973, and that's roughly the sequence of things in 
this decision. Is the action against the defendants? If you 
have a , the against 1 the defendants be-
cause Mr. 's a member of , he mailed the letter and 
with , the new contract was made with Mr. Cov in March of 1973. 
All these things are in furtherance of the cons racy. I should point 
out that every time done under this new contract or it's 
renewed in future years you say that also is in furtherance of 
the conspiracy so that statute never really starts running. I was told 
a story, and it mav be l, that a trial judge in a conspiracy 
case where this was be discussed made the comment to the defendant's 
counsel, "As far as I'm concerned the defense o this case is in fur-
therance of the , so there you've got a case where 
Mr. int can be , even he's only,let's say, 
on per Mr. Hutch is the more culpable 
defendant. let's assume that Mr. did all those things 
bv himself Is Mr. Hutch , now the more culp-
able person, go to be held? The answer is no. He's not, because 
the tort's complete, the is done in November of 1971. Assuming 
you've got a one-year statute, and I should used '74 in my 
because it's a statute, it's too late for the aintiff to 
file an action agains . Hutch So you have is, by virtue 
o a , you br in someone who is onlv sl culpable on 
the outside, and he may be held forever, but f you don't have the con-
' the man whom the real lies, the most culpable 
person off scot free. submit that s doesn't make sense as 
a matter of justice. 
statute? Under what 
t statute 
indue or 








MR. PRESTON: Yes, 
of 
a miscellaneous tort in the catch-
Procedure. 
s t tr 0 




as relates to the 
of limitation. When 
or upon the 
inducement? 
the cases have 
statute is going to start 
virtue of the inter-
of contract, but 
fore, the in-
act 
The contract in this icular instance was terminated by a notice 
of November of 1971, the termination became effective during February 
of 1972 and you can argue that the tort was complete in November, 1971. 
I think you can also argue that the tort was The damage was 
s ffered 1972. The tort is clearly before this 
March of 1972 nmv contract with somebody else. The ff was not 
a party to the new contract at all. In Wyatt, ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Was the plaintiff aware of that new 
contract? 
MR. FRESTON: Well, of course, the plaintiff was aware his 
own contract was terminated. Even if there had been no ... 
ASSEJ\1BLYMAN STIRLING: Is that not when the damage would 
actually occur? 
MR. PRESTON: No, if there had been no new contract, there 
still would have been damage because the plaintiff ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But, is that not when he learned that 
his own contract had been terminated. Isn't that when the damage 
occurred? 
MR. FRESTON: I would say that that's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: A.nd, so it would be two years from 
that date? 
MR. FRESTON: Yes, that was our position and that was 
November of 1971. The new contract doesn't affect his damage. He 
loses his -- I'm going work for you, I've lost my contract, even if 
no one else does work for you. I have had my damage. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: And the plaintiff waited more than 
two years from that date? 
MR. FRESTON: Yes. 
ASSEM.BLYMAN STIRLING: Y.ihy? 
MR. FRESTON: You'd have to ask the plaintiff. I certainly 
can't answer that. 
ASSEMBLY~1AN STIRLING: Then it didn't come out during the 
course of the law and motion discussions on this particular subject? 
MR. FRESTON: The mental gymnastics the plaintiff went through 
did not come out. But he knew in November of 1971 that he was losing 
his contract. He was out of business with respect to that contract, 
and his contract actually,in fact, ended during February of 1972. Now 
the new contract is in furtherance of a conspiracy, but that particu-
lar activity was not a plaintiff-related activity in the sense that the 
further activities in the Wyatt case were, because the plaintiff didn't 
participate in those activities even though it was in furtherance of 
that conspiracy which led to the loss of the plaintiff's own contract. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Then you try to figure the justifi-
cation of the conspiracy theory being created anyway. 
MR. PRESTON: Well, I understand why the conspiracy is there, 
and 's because someone else l Mr. Quint helped Mr. Hutchings in 
some way to do a wrongful act, and Mr. Quint's just as liable as Mr. 
Hutchings, even though Mr. Quint did some incidental things. 
ASSEHBLYMAN STIR.LING: But isn't it really for the purpose 
of simply extending the statute? Wasn't the conspiracy theory which 
extends the statute of limitation period, wasn't that basically created 
by the courts so as to give this particular aintiff a longer period 
of time within which to file the suit? 
MR. PRESTON: I would have to say I don t believe that s true. 
As I ment , rule between at least the time of Bowman v. Wohlke 
and the case I mentioned, Schessler v. Keck, the rule iforn was 
that each tort -- I think you mult famations there. I had 
a case in the mid '60's involving multiple defamations. Each defama-
tion is its own cause of action. And the statute runs on each one from 
the time of the publication the defamation. And the only reason 
that the civil cons racy tolling situation arose California, which 
it did in Schessler v. Keck -- that's the first case I ve ever found 
deal way ~ was because the defendant who had a good 
defense Bowman v. Wohlke, conceded that he didn t have a defense 
when the plaintiff,gras for straws,cited a criminal case where a 
cons racy is a substantive crime. The inti f makes that argument, 
the defense says, "Yes, that's ht. I on that issue." It 
really wasn't reasoned. The court was misled that has led to a 
line of cases dealing with that situat I have never seen a 






a sl cul r which runs the thing out 
the bad guy he' be ff scot free. 
purpose 
has to sue. Isn 
basical does 
a in 
of extending o 
that what we 
It was created 
point, what 
by the court, 
an ier case. That 
the amount of time that 
real come out ? 
for the purpose, this 
was created for the purpose of al ff a 
period of t within which to br suit. 
l\1R. PRESTON: 
agree 
the purpose of mak 
he 't actual 
a civil consp racy. 
was? No, I 
racy was created for 
responsible for a tort even though 
cowmit the tort. That's the purpose for 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That's the result of it that's not 
the purpose purpose was to g the intiff a longer 





the civil conspiracies situation was 
, I can't tell you how far back it 
MR. FRESTON: And, it was in existence during a lengthy 




ASSEMBLYJ11AN STIRLING: I'm sorry. I'm asking the purpose of 
rule, not the conspiracy theory, I understand that. I mean 
was apparently created by the court for the purpose of giving 
plaintiff a longer period of time to sue. 
MR. FRESTON: You mean the Wyatt rule. vlell that's what 
~t~ did with it. Yes, as I say, in Bowman v. Wohlke the Supreme 
Court said, "Yes f in conspiracies. Everybody Is res~ponsible, but it 
doesn't e~tend the statute." That was the point I was making. So 
the principal reason for civil conspiracy is not to extend the statute 
of l~mitations, that was an afterthought. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I understand that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN WILLIE L. BROWN, JR.: Let me ask a question of 
you Mr. Freston. Prior to either the Wyatt case or the second case you 
cited, nad the statute of limitations ever been extended by virtue of 
the fact that a civil conspiracy was involved? 
MR. FRESTON: Not that I am aware of in California. As I 
say, there is a California Supreme Court case which said it is not 
extended. And Chief Justice Bird and Justice Richardson differ on 
their interpretation of that case. I suggest that Justice Richardson's 
reading on that case is correct, and that the Supreme Court had said 
it does not extend. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: As the law now stands in the Wyatt and 
the Schessler cases, the statute of limitations is never tolled if 
there 1s a c1vil conspiracy. 
MR. FRESTON: Is never tolled if there is a civil conspiracy? 
I would say 1t is tolled if there is a civil conspiracy so long as 
anything is done that can be pointed to as being some sort of act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, and that's an extremely broad concept. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: But it only commences to be tolled from 
the date of that last alleged act? 
MR. FRESTON: That's when the statute starts running, that's 
correct. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Okay. Do you have anything else? 
MR. FRESTON: Yes, I'd just like to make one other comment 
which I think ties into this and goes to the question of discovery and 
the running of the statute. I think the courts have commenced to broaden 
that, this relates to it, it is not precisely the point, but I think 
that the Committee should consider the judicial enlargement of the 
typical fraud statute of limitations rule that the statute starts to 
run from discovery whenever that may be, and the possibility of having 
two rules should exist. Mainly, where you have a special relationship 
such as the fiduciary relationship, discovery makes very good sense. 
Where you have no special relationship between the parties, I think the 
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traditional rule that the statute starts running when the cause of 
action is complete perhaps may make more sense. The effect of this is 
to shift the burden a 1 bit because it is very simple for a plain-
tiff to stand up and say, "I didn't know," which shifts a tremendous 
burden to a defendant in fiduciary cases that makes good sense .. In 
ordinary cases, I think that where a person has suffered damage, that 
should be enough to start the statute of limitations running, requiring 
him to f out what's go on unless you have a rule which is simi-
lar to what is generally followed in the federal courts, and which the 
courts in California have occasionally applied, although usually they 
don't find they need to. That is, the statute is tolled during such 
period of time in those situations where the defendant in involved in 
fraudulent concealment of the cause of act Lest somebody argue 
that this means a plaintiff may not real be hurt for years and years 
and the statute will have run, I suggest that in these situations the 
case of action actually matures when the f suffers damage. And 
if the damage n't real suffered until , the court is going to 
find that the cause of action didn't accrue until that later time. And 
I call the Committee's attention to a case of some years ago 
points this out, though not qu in the statute of limitations 
and is narrower than courts would find today in product liabil 
what not, but that case is Hale v. DePaoli 33 Cal. 2d, in 1948, where 
the defendant a rail , and 19 years 
later it broke, the iff was hurt, there was no problem with the 
cause of action. So I'm not sugges that in that case the cause of 
action would have been barred some 18 years ago or so. I think you 




CHAIID4AN FENTON: Thank you very much. Douglas DeVries. 
Thank you, Mr. 
DeVries 
Trial 
Chairman, and members 
I'm an attorney in Sac~ 
Association, and in 
Klein who, 
is in a Sacramento against Union 
Home Loan on behalf of five families who have the threat of losing their 
homes being held over them today. In that context I take exception 
to Mr. Van 's remarks that the abuses of th industry are behind 
us, and ly ith respect to Union Horne Loans. 
lar po 
MR. DeVRIES: These are the facts. Our office is associ-
30 cases. I that there are others 
which I believe some of the other witnesses 
ss. 




Generally, in terms of pol 
tations in this context, and statutes 
underlying the statute of 1 
, we believe that the 
law should be enacted t the rather than the 
10-
• 
tors of fraud. And this especial be true in the context 
fiduc relationsh by definition involve people with su-
perior knowl and ise are, in effect, advis the people 
that come to them about how to manage their affairs. And when they 
that situation to bilk those have a situ-
where the law t favor the victim. Another that comes 
into here, I believe, the policy that disputes between c zens 
should be on their merits, and it is in that context that it 
generally held that the statute of limitations is a disfavored de-
fense. It's a bar to keep people from courts and allow them 
to resolve their dis on their merits. So, what you have is a li-
mited purpose for a statute of limitations that has as its primary 
purpose, as the Wyatt court said, the protection of defendants only in 
the context of allowing them not to be burdened with defending against 
stale claims. 
Now, in the context of the Wyatt case and ones before this 
Committee, there are three basic areas that I bel we can address 
in stale claims. One is the availability of evidence. Well, in the 
situation you have before you, you have a scheme that is an ongoing 
manipulation of loans and loan interest where the loans are continual 
being collected on, up to and often including the time the complaint 
is filed. The evidence is clearly all there, because the account in 
effect is still open at the time of discovery. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What's the time of discovery that you're 
referring to? 
MR. DeVRIES: Well, the situation for instance on a three 
year loan, such as the Wyatt facts -- when the loan comes around to 
the three years, and the balloon payment that was hidden from the per-
son becomes evident, and they realize that they owe as much or more 
than they actually borrowed, they have knowledge of facts they didn't 
have when the loan was taken out. Now the question is, and I think 
this gets to another point, are the people sleeping on their rights, 
when they don't file a suit right then? Well as the Wyatt court pointed 
out in recognizing the situation, they're in a from which there is 
very little escape. The you're talk about are that 
probably wouldn't have qualified for the loans in terms of the full 
payment of the loans. All they were paying was interest and a very 
small part of the principal. In that case, I believe it was $18 a 
month. Now, when they discovered that, the option that's given to 
them not to renew the loan, rather, it's to negotiate a new loan 
for which a fee collected. Now the alternative to that 
to go out and look for other money. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: t.Yell isn't there also an alternative of 
filing the lawsu1t when they discover it? 
MR. DeVRIES: Well you have a problem. You still have the 
loan, you threat of foreclosure. 
CHAIRMAN l·'ENTON: Can't you stay that with your lawsuit 
based on fraud? 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Yes, that's automatic. 
-11-
MR. DeVRIES: Yes, that's right. Those are stayed, but we're 
getting off the point. That's when they get to a lawyer. What these 
people are doing -- The question in the statute of limitations situ-
ation as to whether a plaintiff is sleep on his rights, is not whether 
there are procedural remedies available to them. What we're talking 
about is, as Mr. Van Camp said, balancing the equities between the parties. 
Well, what those parties were doing, in these cases, was trying to meet 
their financial obligations to a party who they thought they didn't 
understand. Not somebody that had defrauded them. They went to look 
for other money, and when they made applications for other money, to see 
if they could get a to pay off that loan, credit inquiries then 
went to the sister corporations of Union Home Loan, Western Computer 
Services, for instance, who told the people as for credit informa-
tion, "No, these people own us money. They're a bad credit risk." So 
they couldn't get the money. So then they go back, so then they renew 
the loan. In other words, kept their relationship. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Let me ask a question. If an inquiry is 
made to a credit report1ng agency and there a debt outstanding, 
how does the credit agency avoid revealing that information if they 
are literally bound to properly represent what the true facts are from 
their knowledge? 
MR. DeVRIES: That's exactly right. report it, it's 
true. The people were in default. They 't pay their ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: But they have to report that, do they 
not? 
MR. DeVRIES: Yes. 
not it, and 
another loan? 
MR. DeVRIES: It not a ir report it. 
, renewed the loan? In other words, if you 
understand the facts of the Wyatt situation, a payment that was late 
was considered to them in a position where their loan would not 
be renewed. So the way you could pay off the first loan, was to 
loan a new loan. It wasn t cant the exis ob-
was creat a loan for which there was a 
when you to the end of the first loan, the 
Home Loan was not cont the same relationship. They wanted 






CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, if the same thing occurred at the 
had occurred at the end of the first, then 
statute until the people decided they 
Is that what you're saying? 
MR. DeVRIES: No. What is that the people that 
960's, 
to fulfi 1 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I understand that. 
Union Home Loan, 
their loans in 
MR. DeVRIES: All right. What put them in the courts was 
their realizat1on that the real damage they were going to suffer was 
at the end, always at the end. It was when all the late charges that 
didn't know about kept accruing. It was when they discovered 
t'1at what they were doing was -- every time there was a late charge 
were interest. 
CHAI~AN FENTON: That was on the first loan? 
MR. DeVRIES: 
taken away from them. 
Right. And then their homes were going to be 
That's when they went to lawyers. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: On the first loan, before they negotiated 
the second one? 
MR. DeVRIES: The first loan didn't exist anymore. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: They had negotiated the second one? 
MR. DeVRIES: Right. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: All right. My question to you, if for in-
stance they hadn't gone to a lawyer at the second loan, and let's say 
at the end of the second one the same thing again, do you feel that 
the statute should continually be tolled? 
MR. DeVRIES: No. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You understand what I'm asking you? 
MR. DeVRIES: I do. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I'm not quarreling with you. I'm just 
trying to get your reasons. 
MR. DeVRIES: What I'm suggesting is, in the context of what 
a conspiracy 1s, whether it's tort or not a tort, or whether the Wyatt 
case has ih fact, changed the statute of limiations or not, I think 
answers your question. The nature of the wrong alleged in the Wyatt 
case, and upon which the jury gave its verdict, was that the defendant 
had designed a scheme that went beyond a three year loan relationship. 
It had as its purpose the maintenance of an on going relationship 
with a victim, from whom money could be obtained, on an on going basis. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I know that. 
MR. DeVRIES: That's the nature and scope of (inaudible). 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I know that. But if they did this the 
second time, and they hid it again, with your theory, you would con-
tinually toll the statute, right? 
MR. DeVRIES: Well, it's not my theory. It's the idea ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, it is what you're telling us now. 
MR. DeVRIES: It's the idea that as long as the defendant 
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is perpetrating the tort, it's an ongoing tort, that tort has not 
concluded. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Regardless of the fact that the plaintiff 
has discovered it, knows about it, knows about the extra charges and 
so forth, and for whatever reason gets another loan, then as long as 
this relationship exists, and they are committing a tort, then the 
statute should be tolled until the plaintiff brings an action? 
where 
MR. DeVRIES: Until the defendant terminates the wrong doing. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Either way. Okay. 
Because we're not talk 
rstand We are talk 
about a situation 
about a combina-






CHAIRMAN FENTON: I understand that. 
DeVRIES: ... that was designed to take advantage of these 
as you could keep them ignorant of their rights. 
But when the baloon payment becomes due, 
been victimized. 
MR. DeVRIES: Well, they discover that their homes are going 
them. 
MR. DeVRIES: Yes. knew that. 
CHAIRMAN 
MR. DeVRIES: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Then tell us in the context of 
matter, d commence to run, and to what 
should it run? 
MR. DeVRIES: We agree with the holding in Wyatt and the 
cases t in other areas before the Wyatt case, 
such Schessler, and about four or five others cited by the courts 
loan frauds. The courts held that if the nature 
of is such than is be perpetrated by a combination of two 
or more , an bas , such that the defendants are bene-
£ from the wrong do , at the very least the statutes should 
not commence to run unti such time as the wrongful conduct has termi-
nated. The statute f was not the Wyatt de-
The ion is when the is As long as 
you have people in ion still perpetrating the fraud, the tort 
has not concluded. 
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CHAIRMJ\N FJ::N'I'ON: Are there other 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Wait a minute. I m wait 
answer to my quest1on. 
for the 
MR. DeVRIES: So the answer when the tort concludes, 
assuming that the person has knowledge of the facts constituting the 
fraud, the statute commences to run. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: And is your then that from the 
first contract, that there is no cessation. If they're ten additional 
separate contracts, it relates back to a continuation of the first 
contract. That's your theory. 
MR. DeVRIES: That's the scheme. That's not my theory. 
That was You see ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Wait a minute wait a minute. That is 
your theory. That would have to be your theory. 
MR. DeVRIES: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: That would have to be your , other-
wise, your theory would have to obviously be that if from day one, 
through day fifteen with contract fifteen, the circumstances are similar. 
The funding source is similar, the procedures are similar. The balloon 
payment is similar, then you, under your theory, argue that all fifteen 
contracts shall be the subject of a lawsuit, rather than just the con-
tract discovered within the two year period. 
MR. DeVRIES: Yes, I agree with you, that is my theory, but 
with one point of clarification. The plaintiff must still prove that 
one of the purposes for getting the person into the first loan was 
to get them hooked on, as the court referred to it, a treadmill, that 
would allow you to keep bringing them back in for the similar loans. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: So, under your , you would con-
cede if on ts there is a transfer of business rela-
tionships from X to Y, and Y had no way of knowl of 
X did period, the records would not reflect it,et cetera, then the 
first eight, when the lawsuit is commenced, could only t X 
and not against Y. 
MR. DeVRIES: Correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Is that a concession that you make? 
MR. DeVRIES: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Is that a concession that's made the 
Wyatt case? 
MR. DeVRIES: I believe so. That in fact was not in the 
Wyatt case because 1t happened that all the defendants were in the 
conspiracy. But, with one exception in the facts, I think was 
Mrs. Flink ... 
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ASSEHBLYMAN BROWN: Well, I don't know the case. I don't 
know what you're talk1ng about. 
MR. DeVRIES: With the exception of one defendant. Yes, if 
the person then 1s outside of the conspiracy, and that conspiracy is 
no longer perpetrating the underlying tort of fraud on the person, 
and they have knowledge of facts, they have an obligation to file a 
lawsuit within three years. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: So, your theory finally is, I take it 
Mr. DeVries, that as a minimum, the statute of limitations should 
not commence to run until there is total cessation of conduct by the 
al conspirators? 
MR. DeVRIES: Directed against that plaintiff. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: That plaintiff and then you add, on top 
of that, the fact that the plaintiff must have acquired knowledge, or 
had a reasonable opportunity to acquire knowledge at or about the time 
of the cessation. 
MR. DeVRIES: Or before. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Is the same theory applicable where it 
is only a single tortfeasor? 
MR. DeVRIES: That issue, as has been pointed out in 
the Committee staff's analysis of this bill, was specifically reserved 
the court. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: My question to you is should your theory 
? 
MR. DeVRIES: Should the same theory apply if an individual 
scheme? 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Yes, one corporation. 
MR. DeVRIES: One corporation, as a single entity? 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Yes. 
own view, 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You answered me that as long as they keep 
tak , instance, until they take their last pay-
ment or commit the last act, the statute doesn't run. 
MR. DeVRIES: Yes, if .. 
CHAIRM&~ FENTON: Maybe they send them a notice that of 
foreclos ike that. 
MR. DeVRIES: Yes, if that is a legitimate concern, that 
there is a distinction between the two, then the person who is ingen-
ius enough to carry this off himself, which is unlike , but, 
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assuming they did, their rights should be determined with the ongoing 
fraud as opposed to somebody -- in other words, if the distinction is 
not between multiple tortfeasors and single tortfeasors, but rather 
between single acts of fraud, and ongoing schemes of fraud, it's the 
ongoing shcemes t.hat should.b~ treated together. Whether they are 
carried off by an enterprising individual, or by a combination of 
people. 
Now, getting on to the other part of stale claims that was 
brought up, the notion of unavailability of witnesses. In this situ-
ation, just on the real facts of the Wtatt case, the problem the de-
fendants have in this case is the avai ability of witnesses and former 
employees, not the unavailability. You are being asked to consider a 
change in law. As it stands right now the statute is the way it is. 
No one,certainly not Union Home Loan, has shown any prejudice by virtue 
of the unabailability of witnesses. In fact, the idea that they didn't 
defend themselves in the lawsuit is a misstatement. The principals of 
Union Home Loan chose not to appear at trial. Their depositions, how-
ever, had been taken and were read to the jury, and the jury had an 
appreciation of the relationship of the principals to the scheme. 
Now, the matter of whether a criminal conspiracy is itself 
a crime, and whether a similar conspiracy is itself a tort, I will 
leave to other gentlemen who I think are probably better versed than 
I. I would close with just one general comment. And that is that 
this professed need for a change in the law from the Legislature is 
not being asked by the commercial banking industry. Nor in fact, is 
it beamg asked for by the mortgage brokerage industry as a whole. It 
is being asked for by the Union Home Loan Company, which is one company, 
one private company. And as to that company, I would remind each of 
you that the Supreme Court of California characterized them in these 
terms. "There was substantial evi(lence that appellants were involved 
in perfecting a scheme whoe purpose was to trap respondents on a 
financial treadmill from which they could not escape. There has been 
no counter-balancing evidence presented as to prejudice to that entity." 
Thank you for your time. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: May I ask one question? 
MR. DeVRIES: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Are they now showing up as witnesses? 
MR. DeVRIES: Well, we will probably know it about a week 
or so. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Oh, I see. There have been no subsequent 
trials where persons have been subpoenaed and exercised the inability 
of the subpoena to reach in the certain jurisdiction. 
MR. DeVRIES: Well, that may change too because I believe 
the subpoena range ~s changing to 500 miles, but I don't believe it's 
going to happen until after January 1st. In the meantime the five 
consolidated cases in trial in Sacramento right now are still in the 
plaintiff's phase. They're in about their fourth week. I suppose 
that the defendants can make their decision whether to come forward 
and tell their side in about a week or two. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Am I to understand you are a co-counsel 
in these cases? 
MR. DeVRIES: No, I'm the partner of one of the co-counsels. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Okay. Then I won't ask you the rest of 
the questions. Thank you very much. 
Mr. Allan Emkirn; 
MR. ALLAN EMKIN: Mr. Chairman, members, my name is Allan 
Ernkin. I am here representing the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles. 
I have with me two staff attorneys from our South Central office, which 
is at the corner of Manchester and Broadway, in the middle of South 
Central Los Angeles. And they will express to you their feelings of 
about any proposed legislation dealing with the Wyatt holding. First, 
Paul Tremblay. 
MR. PAUL TREMBLAY: Thank you. I want to start by giving 
an example of a case that I'm handling right now. It's in litigation 
in the courts in Los Angeles. It's a fairly recently filed case. Some 
of the facts I'm not sure of myself. But what we do know, the horne-
owners are Earry and Uretha Jones. They've owned their horne since the 
late fifties. The home is free and clear right now, except for an ob-
ligation to Union Horne Loans. The Jones' went to Union Horne Loan in 
1973, and they contracted for a loan in the amount of $1,400. 
Somehow between 1973 and 1980, they made most of the payments in this 
loan. We're not real sure exactly what happened during that period 
of time, but it's their claim at least, that they made most of the pay-
ments. They did miss some, and we wouldn't claim otherwise. In early 
1980, or perhaps late 1979, Union Horne Loan foreclosed, claiming that 
the Jones' still owed close to $1,000 dollars on this $1,400 dollars, 
which they had been paying on for seven years. We filed the lawsuit, 
and we've stayed the foreclosure, although it's certainly not an auto-
matic procedure, as it was said earlier. There are cases where,sorne-
tirnes, the request for the stay of foreclosure is denied. In this 
case, though, we were able to stay a foreclosure. Actually, in this 
case, the request for the stay of foreclosure was denied, but we were 
able to get the unlawful detainer transferred to superior court, so 
that's the way we're keeping them in possession, in the meantime, while 
this case is being litigated. The fraud involved in the dase of the 
Jones' was that they were not aware that this $1,400 dollar loan in-
cluded a trust deed on their property. And in their case ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Wasn't the court concerned with potential 
fraud when it refused to stay the foreclosure? 
MR. TREMBLAY: No, the problem in this case is that an 
alleged bonafied purchaser named Hubert Goldberg, who has purchased 
other Union Horne Loan contracts before, or purchased homes at Union 
Horne Loan sales, purchased the property, and he went in and said, 
"I'm an innocent purchaser." The court tended to think that he was. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: And that's about the only time the court 
has ever denied a stay. 
MR. TREMBLAY: But that happens a lot. And in those cases 
the homeowners will be out of possession and all their equity will be 
gone. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Those are a different set of facts. 
MR. TREMBLAY: Certainly. I really wanted to point out that 
's not automat1c. You can go in and ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: No, it isn't. But there has to be a dif-
ferent set of facts. If it's the original trust deed, and the original 
trustor, and the original trustee, and the original beneficiary, it's 
almost automatic. 
MR. TREMBLAY: I would concede that. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: -Is that correct? 
MR. TREMBLAY: Yes, although without the Wyatt rule it cer-
tainly wouldn't be. Because,in this case, the Jones' d1dn't know 
about the fact of a trustee until the house was in foreclosure. And 
they didn't come to a lawyer until -- well they didn't get notice of 
the sales, so they didn't come to me until after the sale. Now let's 
assume that .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: They didn't get notice of the sale? 
MR. TREMBLAY: No, they didn't get notice of the sale either. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Is that an established fact or an alleged 
fact? 
MR. TREMBLAY: It's an alleged fact. In this case,they didn't 
know, they didn't discover the fraud until very late, so Wyatt would 
not be directly applicable. We could assume that tnere--are s1milar 
situations where they would discover the fact that there's a trust deed 
soon after the incidence of the loan. But that's not the time that 
they go to lawyers. I mean they don't go to lawyers until the property 
is actually in foreclosure. And if that had happened in this case it 
would have been seven years later. Without Wyatt, the statute of li-
mitations would have tolled, and even though these folks stand to lose 
their home, without a rule like the Wyatt rule, their house would be 
gone. There's no statute of limitations applicable to trustee. sales. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: But in your case you have a presumed bona-
fide purchaser, right? 
MR. TREMBLAY: We disagree that he's a bonafide purchaser. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: But if you do, then Wyatt wouldn't apply 
in any event, if the court buys it. 
MR. TREMBLAY: Well, no, it damages against Union Home Loan, 
you could go after Union Home Loan. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Yes, that was what I was bringing up. 
MR. TREMBLAY: Well, without Wyatt they couldn't even go 
after Union Home Loans for damages relat1ng to the original fraud. 
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You can't any better 
not 
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ASSEMBLYMAN BRO'W"N: All So you then would suppor~.-
the theory that ~rom the aay you are evicted, that statute, whatever 
it be, should commence to run? 
MR. TREMBLAY: That would take care of the problem with fore-
closure that I was aadress 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: That was not actually eviction he's re-
ferring to-nut rather notice of foreclosure, or something like that. 
MR. TREMBLAY: Something like that. Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Yes. Some objective measurement that 
persons who are in the commercial field could rely upon. So they would 
know that point beyond which their books can be closed on the Jones in-
cident will be three years from the date that they initiated the fore-
closure action. Or the foreclosure action was initiated. 
MR. TREMBLAY: I agree that that would deal with the problem 
that I brought up, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: It may not have satisfied them. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Right. 
MR. EMKIN: Exactly. It would not satisfy this type of scheme 
because you would have a continuing point where you could go after the 
original act. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: 
very reasonable to say to the 
scheme, but if you attempt to 
property that is the point at 
Except it seems to me very rational and 
commercial world, "You can run that 
collect on that scheme by taking the 
which the statute commences to run." 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Otherwise it continues, no statute. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Otherwise, it's open-ended until you do 
that. 
MR. EMKIN: The only question would be, how creative they 
become in transferring the property. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: We understand that the talent on the 
other side is better than the talent on your side. 
MR. EMKIN: I would differ with that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I don't mean any disrespect. I just 
mean the creativity is there, so we might as well not attempt to legis-
late to block the creativity because the geniuses are incredible when 
it cqmes to those kinds of schemes. But we do need to be rational and 
reasonable in how we try to regulate them. We'll figure out how to do 
something else to them, when we find out their next step. 
MR. BRYON J. GROSS: I think Mr. Brown has really focused in 
on what I was go1ng to po1nt out, an element of the problem. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: State your name for the record. 
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MR. GROSS: Yes, my name is Bryon Gross, staff attorney in 
the South Centra! office of Legal Aid also. The gentleman speaking on 
behalf of Union Horne Loans seemed very concerned about the plaintiff 
waiting, storing up his or her damages and waiting to sue and bene-
fitting from the Wyatt rule by doing that. And I think that we really 
need to focus on the defendant waiting and not taking action 
specifically because of the statute of lirniafion. we had. a case in 
our office, actually it was one of Elena's cases. I'm sure she would 
have loved to be here to tell you about it. There was a horne improve-
ment case, it was a home imporvernent case which you've heard so much 
about. You looked puzzled, Mr. Brown. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I want to know who this Elena is? 
MR. EMKIN: Elena is a legal services attorney. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Oh, I see. All right. 
MR. GROSS: She's a senior attorney in our office and haa 
apparently appeared before Mr. Fenton's committee. Anyway, she had 
this horne improvement case where a contract was made with the horne 
improvement company and sold to a finance agency. The work was never 
finished. The finance agency gave the right to rescission notices 
long after the contract was done. They were not given at the right 
time, and when the client got that, they immediately sent them in and 
thought they had rescinded the contract. And therefore it took no 
further action. The holder of the contract waited longer than three 
years because he knew that that was the statute of limitations for 
fraud, and he waited longer than three years, purposely did not make 
any attempts to collect payments from people. Didn't make any at-
tempts to collect on the contract. Didn't hassle them or anything, 
and then popped up with the foreclosure when he thought the statute 
of limitations had run. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: All right. Let me stop you there, Mri 
Gross. Suppose the Iaw was such that from the date they sent that back, 
the statute ran, both as to his right to file the claim and their right 
obviously to defend it, would not, once he waits that entire period of 
time bar him from proceeding? 
MR. GROSS: No, he ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Wait a minute, along the foreclosure line? 
You follow what I'm suggesting? 
MR. GROSS: No, I'm sorry I don't follow you. If he was not 
allowed to, if the statute of limitations on his action did not lapse ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: He can't foreclose, if he goes beyond. 
MR. GROSS: I think there should be. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Would that not solve another one of the 
problems? 
MR. GROSS: Yes it would. And that would make it much clearer 
too. You wouidn 1 t have to ..• 
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ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: From the date of the notice of resc ~ion, 
the statute commenced to run on his right to foreclosure, and exercise 
his rights as the creditor against the debtor. 
MR. GROSS: That would somewhat solve the problem. Now, in 
this case, it so happened that the people actually sent in a written 
notice of rescission. There might be cases where an unsophisticated 
homeowner might not actually do that, and I don't think it would com-
pletely solve that problem, because the finance agency would still be 
able to come in and foreclose after three years. I don't think that 
they should be allowed to wait. We've seen many cases where numerous 
finance agencies had just sat on the contracts and waited for years 
purposely, you know, to let the statutes run. As long as they have 
that economical hold over the person that was pointed out in the Wyatt, 
I don't think they should be allowed to use that statute of limitat~ons 
to their benefit. The person speaking for Union Home Loans focused on 
this 30 years as if it was an incredibly long time, and it was a stale 
claim. But the point is, the claim was still alive. That bank or sav-
ings and loan or loan broker still has power over that person's prop-
erty, and is able to come in and foreclose on that property. 
I'd just like to point out also that the Wyatt case is not 
a fluke case and the other gentleman was speaking about the five con-
solidated trials in Sacramento. We know there's many Union Home Loan 
cases. But Union Home Loan is not the only finance agency that perpe-
trated this scheme. I had some clients come in last month. A really 
sweet hard-working~elderly~couple. They live in Watts. They worked 
all their lives and now they're on Social Security. Their house was 
almost entirely paid for, and they just wanted to borrow some money to 
do some home improvement. They got a loan for $21,000. About $5,000 
of that was for commission and brokers fees. They were told that they 
were going to pay $300 a month and at the end of the year the loan 
would be renewed. Now they didn't know what that meant. They thought 
well, they said as long as your payments are current your loan will be 
renewed. Well fine, but at the end of the year they found out that all 
they'd been paying was interest. It wasn't a renewable loan. The fi-
nance agency offered them a new loan. The loan was now $22,000. Now 
they owed actually $1,000 more than they did after the first year of 
paying $300 a month. Now these people signed the new loan, they didn't 
know what else to do. They were up against a foreclosure. Fortu-
nately, they came into me and I'm going to try to get them a legiti-
mate loan from somewhere. They're up against foreclosure now because 
they have a year on the second loan as long as they make their payments. 
You know, we have time to arrange a fully amortized loan for them from 
a legitimate lending agency. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, assuming for the sake of discussion 
you're not able to get them another loan, you presumably will allege 
there's fraud involved. 
MR. GROSS: Right, then I'll have to file a lawsuit. But it 
won't be a problem in their case because they discovered it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Let's take it a little bit further then. 
Let's say that they did come to you and at the end of the year you 
haven't been able to put together an amortized loan. And for the next 
three years you keep them renewing, and it goes not for $22,000, it's 
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now up to $27,000, with the fees and all that other stuff. The original 
$21,000 is going up to $27,000, and they've been paying $300 a month for 
four years. Under those circumstances when they've been to see you, 
and you've laid out to them what their problem is, when should the stat-
ute commence to run? 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thanks, Willie, for phrasing my question. 
MR. GROSS: In the circumstances where they've been to see 
me? I don't think that that should change it. I think that as long 
as the scheme is going on -- they came to see me and I explained it to 
me, and I explained it to them, but they might have come to see some-
one else. 
MR. EMKIN: What if they had gone to a private attorney who 
asked for cash up front. And they were $20.00 over our poverty limit. 
They cannot get free legal services. They're not going to get a pri-
vate lawyer to take their case on spec. And in fact, even though they 
might have gotten some legal advice, they couldn't execute. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, wouldn't that lawyer then suggest 
they go to you? 
MR. EMKIN: They might be $25.00 a month over our very 
limited income category. 
MR. GROSS: Or they might try to reach us and our appoint-
ments might be filled that week. We have a real struggle to satisfy 
the legal needs in the community. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Okay, go ahead. 
MR. GROSS: That's all I want to say. I feel that that 
should not toll it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: That's a fair response. 
MR. GROSS: I think that as long as finance agencies continue 
their scheme that the clients should be able to sue. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Yes, Allan. 
MR. EMKIN: It was mentioned earlier that bad facts make bad 
laws. Well, we're looking a a lot of bad facts throughout the whole 
state affecting a whole lot of homeowners. And we didn't create the 
bad facts. And I don't think that you should put what I call the clients 
of the world in jeopardy because the creator of the bad facts is now 
coming up with what I would call, a very, very slender legal argurtent 
to safeguard themselves from future attacks against civil conspiracy 
in the oast. And one other issue. And that was, as Mr. Brown mentioned, 
what about if it was an individual? I think -.if-th-e statute Ts--amerided 
it should include individuals who act in a similar manner. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you. Ron Reiter. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Let me ask one question, Allan. I gather 
that Mr. DeVr1es was not totally accurate when he says only Union Home 
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Loan is subject to being handled in the court system by virtue of its 
conduct. You now talked about people who do home improvement loans ... 
MR. EMKIN: We're having to raise this type of issue in a 
number of aifferent areas of litigation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: With other commercial lenders? 
MR. EMKIN: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I just want to make sure that we were not 
using time for only one person, one commercial lender. 
MR. DeVRIES: Mr. Brown, may I address that point. What I 
said was that the only person who has come forward to ask you for re-
lief was Union Home Loan. I didn't say they were the only people who 
might benefit from what they are asking for. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: While you come up Ron, I'd like to intro-
duce Assemblywoman Maxine Waters from Los Angeles. Okay, Ron. 
MR. RONALD REITER: My name is Ronald Reiter, I'm a deputy 
Attorney General. I concur with many of the recent remarks made of 
the maintenance the Wyatt rule on civil conspiracies. It's very clear, 
as people have so far testified, that the purpose of the statute of 
limitations is to prevent the assertion of stale claims. But a claim 
isn't stale when conspiracy is still afoot, and if acts are being done 
in furtherance of the cons-piracy. And we believe that the Wyatt case 
was correct in holding that so long as acts are done to continue 
the conspiracy, as long as these wrongful acts are perpetrated, that 
the statute of limitations should not run. The issue of the statute 
of limitations in civil conspiracy cases is of increasing significance 
to our office because we prosecute cases of wrongdoing civilly, rather 
than criminally. And we principally use section 17200 of the Business 
and Professions Code as our primary vehicle for civil law enforcement. 
Section 17200 has a four year statute of limitations, but unlike the 
fraud statute of limitations, which runs from discovery, the four 
year statute of limitations in 17200 runs from the time of accrual 
of the cause of action. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Ron, if you get complaints about any par-
ticular group perpetrat~ng more than one fraud or scheme, I'm not 
going to mention any names here, do you do anything? Do you investi-
gate that group? Do you understand my question? 
MR. REITER: Yes. Yes we do. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I imagine that's where you come in. 
MR. REITER: That's right. Sometimes we are able to unearth 
things on our own through investigation. Other times cases are brought 
to us by complainants. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Mr. Emkin and others here are indicating 
there are some outfits, and we won't mention names, who presumably are 
pursuing a questionable course of conduct. Do they bring these com-
plaints to you, and you then investigate? 
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to obtain restitution under certain circumstances. But since the tocus 
of the office is more toward law enforcement than it is to represent-
ing ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I'm not criticizing. I'm trying to get in 
my own mine now it functions. 
MR. REITER: Yes. Because we don't represent individualized 
interests of tne people, we try to get what we deem as appropriate 
restitution. But our primary thrust is to enjoin the continued wrong-
ful activity, to stop the violations and also to penalize those vio-
lations. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Excuse me, one other thing. If in your 
investigation you were to find another 20 individuals with the same 
type of contract, but haven't got to the point where the foreclosure 
has started, do you do anything about those cases? 
MR. REITER: Absolutely. As a matter of fact very frequently 
we find out about cases only through one complainant, and then through 
the process of investigation, we may find ~00 or 1,000. And then we 
proceed to begin enjoining the unlawful acts, but also, to the extent 
that we can, obtain restitution for everybody whose been harmed. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: So you can then in effect prevent some of 
the things from occurring to other people? 
MR. REITER: That's right. As a matter of fact, I'm curren-
tly engagea in a case right now against a major home improvement con-
tractor, an air conditioning company, that operates throughout the 
State of California. We're attempting to obtain foreclosure relief 
and the invalidation of about fifteen to twenty thousands of deeds 
of trust that have been placed on homes throughout the State of Cali-
fornia. Our perspective as a law enforcement agency and a public 
agency, is slightly different of course than, than legal aid in the 
consumer type matters. That's why we of course are interested in ob-
taining restitution. And I mentioned our primary thrust is to prevent 
the continued violations of the law, and also to penalize those viola-
tions. Because our statute doesn't have us go from time of discovery, 
we have to sometimes rely on the civil conspiracy statute to reach 
those people who have been involved in concocting the scheme and in 
carrying it on. For example, the Legislature recently addressed the 
issue of people at foreclosure sales who conspire among themselves to 
supress bidding so that there isn't a high enough price bid at the 
sale. It's very hard sometimes to get into conspiracies such as that, 
but we think we're going to be getting into one of them. And from in-
formation that we have, five or six people have been engaging in this 
practice for about a twenty year period. And they have literally 
siphoned off millions and millions of dollars which would otherwise 
have gone to homeowners facing foreclosure after the sale had occurred. 
We're just finding out about it now, and we see that it is a continuing 
conspiracy. If the Wyatt rule were changed and we were limited to a 
statute of limitations of three or four years, it would be seventeen 
years worth of ill-gotten gains that we would not be able to reach. 
So it's very important for us to maintain the Wyatt theory. 
Similarly, there are numerous instances in the foreclosure 
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CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you very much, Ron. 
MR. REITER: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Doug McKee. 
MR. DOUGLAS McKEE: Mr. Chairman, and members. I am Douglas 
McKee for the California District Attorneys Association. Mr. Reiter 
has basically laid out what are the powers of the Attorney General. 
They basically parallel the powers that the local prosecutors have in 
this area and the advantages that the Wyatt case would have to the 
local prosecutor. I want to state on behalf of the California D. A.'s 
Association that we do support retention of the rule as stated in the 
Wyatt case. Now I'm not arguing in this instance whether or not that 
created a new rule or merely restated the rule as it was. But in any 
event, we do support retention of the Wyatt rule. Part of the reason 
for that is that as the first speaker for Union Home Loan stated, it's 
really a balance that we're talking about. A balance with regard to 
stale evidence, and a balan9e between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
For the California D. A.'s Association, in most instances and including 
this instance, we balance in favor of giving the trier of fact the 
greatest amount of evidence so that they can seek the truth. And that's 
the purpose of a trial. In either a criminal trial, or a civil trial, 
the trier of fact should have as much evidence as possible. It's the 
decision of the trier of fact whether or not that evidence is stale, 
whether or not the people or a private individual has sustained his or 
her burden. And again, we think that it's incorrect to shorten the 
statute of limitations in this instance. It changed the law because 
that would in effect, remove from the trier of fact, evidence that may 
be of value in cases. And in most instances, including this one, we're 
opposed to eliminating the limitation of evidence. 
With regard to conspiracies, Mr. Reiter pointed out, in many 
instances you can, and that's been the theory in criminal law, that con-
spiracies generally have the capacity beyond the capacity of an indivi-
dual to do harm. So the law has generally regarded conspiracies with 
stiffer penalties. I agree with Mr. Reiter. If I had a decision to 
make on this thing, I would get rid of what appears to have been an 
anomaly and I would apply the Wyatt rule also to individuals, and get 
rid of what may appear to be an ~llogical distinction in this matter. 
Because again, we think it's very, very important to let the trier of 
fact have as much evidence as possible to decide what the truth is in 
the matter. · 
At least initially we agree with the suggestion of Mr. Brown 
with regard to foreclosures. We would at least initially support that 
proposed amendment to the law. But we do oppose, from the California's 
D. A.'s Association, changing the standard in Wyatt. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you, Doug. Before I call the next 
and last witness, there's a statement here from the State Division of 
Consumer Services who couldn't be here, supporting the Wyatt decision. 
We'll make their statement a matter of record.l Kathleen Hamilton. 
MS. KATHLEEN HAMILTON: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and mem-
bers of the Comm~ttee. My name is Kathleen Hamilton, and I'm the 
1 Appendix 1 
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Director of Consumer Affairs for Stanislaus County. I'm also here this 
morning representing the California Consumer Affairs Association, which 
is the statewide affiliation of local government consumer affairs pro-
grams. 
Local consumer affairs agencies have two primary responsibil-
itiesi providing one-on-one consumer counseling and dispute mediation 
when questions or problems arise out of marketplace transactions. As 
we provide these services on a daily basis, we're in a particularly 
credible position to observe typical consumer behavior and talent as 
well as to assess the most persistent and solution-resistant problems 
encountered in the business-consumer arena. 
I'm here this morning to join some of the other witnesses to 
express my enthusiasm for the court's decision in Wyatt v. Union 
Mortgage. I believe its net impact will be to afford consumers needed 
protect1on, and most importantly, latitude in those instances where 
lack of guile and sophistication creates a host environment for victi-
mization. The behavior and naivete of the Wyatts throughout their 
transaction with Union Mortgage Company represent typical consumer be-
havior, and while unfortunate, that is also, in my opinion, excusable 
and understandable behavior. Given the vast array of transactions the 
average consumer can be expected to participate in in the course of a 
lifetime, the contemporary technology of many of those transactions, 
and the complexity of the legal labyrinth, it's unreasonable to expect 
the average consumer to possess sufficient knowledge and ability to 
protect himself or herself from the unscrupulous. It is therefore 
extraordinarily important that the court afford maximum opportunity for 
the consuming public to recognize a wrong, and to seek redress for that 
wrong. 
I have had frequent conversations over the years with con-
sumers as well as with administrative and law enforcement officials on. 
the frustration of legitimate claims because the statute of limitations 
might arguably have expired. Consumers, trusting as the Wyatts were, 
are unaware of very concept of the statute of limitations and will un-
wittingly spend an inordinate period of time in the pursuit of infor-
mal resolution, before finally contacting a consumer agency or legal 
counsel. Consumers may even become convinced by the perpetrators them-
selves that their cimplaint is without merit. An article which appeared 
earlier this year in Psychology Today Magazine, discussed the inter-
esting psychological relationship that can exist between business and 
the complaining consumer. The unfair business entrepreneur is highly 
skilled at manipulating consumer conduct, at undermining self esteem 
and confidence, and at creating the illusion of mutual trust and sup-
port. The resulting erosion of self-protecting assertiveness contrib-
utes to the problem of unchecked public abuse. 
I believe the element of conspiracy, which is at the very 
heart of the Wyatt case, is its own best argument against the fear of 
vulnerability to stale claims. Where there is an incumbent responsi-
bility to convince the court of the existence of a continuing conspir-
acy before asserting that a statute of limitations continues to run, 
there's virtually no danger of a truly stale claim being preserved. 
As a non-attorney who frequently finds legal jargon confusing, I be-
lieve that the semantics are beautifully adequate here. It seems to 
me that continuing cannot equal stale. 
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I would like to make a few brief observations in closing. 
One, my review of the issue convinces me that the Wyatt decision did 
not create any new law, it merely affirmed, with useful specificity, 
legislative intent in previous court decisions. Second, the nature of 
thP abuses which were alleged in the W~att case has particular signi-
ficance for effective consumer protect~on law enforcement. The element 
of misrepresentation that was at the core of the Wyatt case is at the 
core of most consumer fraud cases. 
Lastly, it seems to me that a critical issue here is the 
nature of a conspiracy. Civil conspiracies, are by their very essence, 
designed to confuse and befuddle the victim. Their success depends 
upon the extent to which they are able to keep a consumer in the dark. 
Given that, in consort with the inherent imbalance of power and knowledge 
in the relationship, the equity of providing maximum opportunity for 
relief becomes evident. To do less would merely offer judicial sanction 
to the most successful conspiracies. The message would be that it's 
okay to defraud the public if you can just keep them on your side long 
enough •. We're grateful for the court's resistance to that kind of re-
ward, and we encourage the Committee's commensurate resistance to any 
efforts to mitigate the application of the Wyatt decision. 
I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to be here this 
morning and appreciate your willingness to hear from a non-attorney. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you very much Kathleen. Any questions? 
I want to thank you all for appearing here, helping us with this very, 
very important and difficult problem, and with that this hearing is 
adjourned. Thank you. 
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October 23, 1980 
Members of the Assembly Judiciary Committee 
Ray LeBov 
Hearing on Statute of Limitations in Civil 
Conspiracies 
On October 27, 1980, the Assembly Judiciary Committee 
will hold an interim hearing on the statute of limitations 
in civil conspiracies. The hearing is scheduled to begin 
at 9:30 a.m. at the California Museum of Science and 
Industry, Space Building, Muses Room, 700 State Drive, 
Exposition Park in Los Angeles. 
The purpose of the memorandum is to provide background 
information that may be of interest to you in preparation 
for the hearing. 
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
The collective term "statute of limitations" is commonly 
applied to a great number of statutes which prescribe the 
time periods within which suits may be brought. 
The main purpose of statutes of limitations is "to promote 
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence 
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just 
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to 
defend within the period of limitation and that the right 
to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over 
the right to prosecute them." (Order of R. R. Telegrafhers 




The chief statutes of limitations are in Code of Civil 
Procedure Sections 312 through 363, but there are others 
throughout the various codes. 
CCP Section 312, the section introducing the limitation 
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, states that 
civil actions can only be commenced within the prescribed 
periods "after the cause of action shall have accrued." 
Generally, the cause of action accrues when the wrongful 
act is done and the obligation or liability arises. Strict 
application of this general rule could produce unfair re-
sults. Therefore, a number of exceptions have been statu-
torily and judicially created. The most important and 
common exception to the general rule of accrual is the 
postponing of the running of the statute on certain causes 
of action until the facts constituting the cause have been discovered. 
Some examples are actions (1) based on fraud or mistake 
(CCP Sec. 338(4), (2) based on breach of fiduciary duty 
(CCP Sec. 343), (3) for malpractice (CCP Sec. 340.5), and 
(4) based on rescission of contract (CCP Sees. 337(3) and 
339(3)). 
CIVIL CONSPIRACIES 
A civil conspiracy is not in itself actionable. It is a 
means by which two or more persons who agree to perform a 
wrongful act may each be held liable for the resulting dam-
age, regardless whether they actually commit the tort them-
selves. 
The basis for an action charging civil conspiracy is not the 
agreement itself, but the damage suffered as the result of 
a tort or torts committed in furtherance of a joint design. 
There is no civil cause of action unless a wrongful act, re-
sulting in damage to the plaintiff, is alleged and proven. 
Therefore, the statute of limitations does not begin to run 
at the time of the agreement; the cause of action does not 
accrue until an overt act constituting a tort is ei~her done 
or discovered, whichever the controlling statute provides. 
Additionally, in Wyatt v Union Home Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 
3d 773 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that when 
a civil conspiracy is properly alleged and proved, the 
statute of limitations does not begin to run on any part 
of the plaintiff's claims until the "last overt act" pur-
suant to the conspiracy has been completed. 
WYATT V UNION HOME MORTGAGE CO. 
In this case, the plaintiff alleged and proved a conspiracy 
to commit fraud and breach of a fiduciary duty. 
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The complaint was based on Union's misleading television 
commercials, its misrepresentation about the terms of a 
loan (including the interest rate, the amount of the loan 
payment, and the policy on late charges), its failure to 
call plaintiff's attention to unfavorable provisions buried 
in the loan papers, and its extraction of late charges on a 
second loan despite the timely payment of all installments. 
The complaint alleged that all of the foregoing resulted 
from a fraudulent conspiracy engaged in by all of the de-
fendants {Union Mortgage Co., its affiliated corporations, 
their principal shareholders, and several of the corpor-
ation's officers and directors.) 
If the statute of limitations were to run from the "accrual" 
of the cause of action as defined in Section 338 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure (that is, from the discovery of the 
fraudulent acts), then some of the plaintiff's claims in 
Wyatt would not have been asserted within the three year 
per1od that is permitted in such actions. However, under 
the "last overt act" rule, all of plaintiffs claims were 
timely brought. 
In holding that the "last overt act" delays the running 
of the statute of limitations, the Court reasoned that "so 
long as a person continues to commit wrongful acts in fur~ 
therance of a conspiracy to harm another, he can neither 
claim unfair prejudice at the filing of a claim against 
him nor disturbance of any justifiable repose built upon 
the passage of time." W*att, {Supra at p. 787.) The 
Court pointed out that t e defendants had continued their 
tortious conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy until 
{and even after) the filing of the complaint. The majority 
opinion further stated that "When, as here, the underlying 
fraud is a continuing wrong, a convincing rationale exists 
for delaying the running of the statute of limitations. 
Just as the statute of limitations does not run against 
an action based on fraud so long as the fraud remains con-
cealed, so ought the statute to be tolled even after the 
fraud is discovered, for so long as the sheer economic 
duress or undue influence embedded in the fraud continues 
to hold the victim in place." (p. 788) 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Richardson argued that 
the "last overt act" doctrine should not be applied in 
civil cases. He stated that acceptance of that rule amounts 
to a concession that the continuing unlawful scheme is in 
itself a tort. Further, Justice Richardson contended that 
the "last overt act" rule is not justified by the equitable 
considerations raised in its defense. He distinguished the 
rule from other safeguards, such as delaying accrual until 
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the discovery of the claim, which have been developed "to 
assure that the strong public policies represented by the 
statute of limitations do not foreclose a plaintiff's 
remedy for wrongs committed against him .••. In contrast, 
the 'last overt act' doctrine operates mechanically, with-
out reference to plaintiff's diligence, affording plaintiff 
the bonanza of a tolled statute for torts upon which he 
long since should have commenced suit." (p. 785) 
The dissenting opinion argued that the rule "encourages 
injured parties to sit by until the conspirational scheme 
has operated with full force and has run its extended 
ultimate course." This rule, Justice Richardson concluded, 
" •.. defeats the purposes of the statute of limitations while 
serving no legitimate needs of injured plaintiffs." (p. 796) 
ALTERNATIVES 
The purpose of this hearing is to examine whether the 
Legislature should amend, repeal, or let stand the "last 
overt act" rule of Wyatt. 
There is no specific legislative proposal before the Com-
mittee relating to the statute of limitations in civil con-
spiracies. However, on April 30, 1980 this Committee 
passed AB 2382 (McVittie) by a vote of 8-2. As passed by 
the Committee, AB 2382 would have amended Section 338 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that, in actions for 
relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, the occurrence 
of any overt act subsequent to discovery of the facts con-
stituting the fraud or mistake would not toll the statute 
of limitations. In addition, AB 2382 would have added 
Section 354.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide 
that, in all tort actions (whether the defendant has acted 
independently, jointly or in concert or combination), the 
time for commencement of an action against shall not be 
extended because of the occurrence of any overt act in 
furtherance of the tort which occurs subsequent to the 
time of the initial injury or damage to the plaintiff 
from the tort. 
The above provisions of AB 2382 were subsequently dropped 
by the bill's author. The bill was enacted (Chapter 1307, 
Statutes of 1980), but,as chaptered, contained only pro-
visions unrelated· to the statute of limitations in civil 
conspiracies. 
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WYATT v. UNION 
24Cal.3d773. 157 
[S.F. No. 23748. Aug. lO. 
JOSEPH R. WYATT et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. 
EXHIBIT B 
773 
UNION MORTGAGE COMPANY et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs brought an action against a loan broker, its 
affiliated corporations, their principal and several of the 
corporations' officers directors, seeking compensatory and punitive 
· damages for breach of duties allegedly owed to plaintiffs during the 
negotiation of a second mortgage loan. The complaint alleged that the 
broker's misleading television commercials, its misrepresentations about 
the terms of the initial loan. including the interest rate, the amount of the 
loan payment and the policy on late charges, its failure to call plaintiff's 
attention to unfavorable provisions buried in the loan papers, and its 
extraction of late charges on the second loan despite the timely payment 
of all installments, was a breach of the fiduciary duty which is owed by a 
mortgage loan broker to those who engage its brokerage services. The 
complaint further alleged that foregoing resulted from a fraudulent 
conspiracy engaged in by all of the defendants. The jury assessed separate 
awards against each defendant, totalling $25,000 in compensatory 
damages and $200.000 in punitive damages. The trial court denied 
defendants' motion for new trial after plaintiffs consented to a reduction 
of the compensatory award to $1,000. (Superior Court of El Dorado 
County, No. 22595, Charles F. Fogerty, Judge.) 
The Supreme Court The court jury justifiably 
concluded that the broker did not satisfy its fiduciary obligation of 
disclosure and good faith toward plaintiffs in regard to the initial loan by 
its materially misleading and incomplete information given in response to 
plaintiffs' questions about rate of interest, late payments, and the size of 
the balloon payment due at the end of the loan period. The court also 
held there was substantial evidence of actual fraud involved the second 
loan, arising out of defendants charging plaintiffs with several late 
charges in the absence of any evidence that such charges were proper. 
[Aug. 1979} 
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774 WYATT v. UNION MoRTGAGE Co. 
24 Cal.3d 773; !57 Cai.Rptr. 392. 598 P.2d 45 
Noting that the record disclosed a tightly knit, family-oriented business 
operation under the principal shareholders' dose personal control, the 
court held the breaches of fiduciary duties owed to plaintiffs were 
undertaken pursuant to established company policies agreed to by each 
of the defendants. The court further held that when a civil conspiracy is 
properly alleged and proved, the statute of limitations does not begin to 
run on any part of the plaintiff's claims until the "last overt act" pursuant 
to the conspiracy has been completed, and the "last overt act" was 
defendants' collection a few weeks before trial of the final payment of the 
seco!ld loan. Accordingly, the court held the trial court correctly refused 
to instruct the jury on the statute of limitations. The court also held the 
evidence was sufficient to justify awarding punitive damages, and that the 
amount awarded was not excessive. (Opinion by Bird; C. J., with 
Tobriner, Mosk, Manuel and Newman, JJ., concurring. Separate concur-
ring and dissenting opinion by Richardson, J., with Clark, J., concurring.) 
HEAD NOTES 
Classified to California Digest of Official Reports, 3d Series 
(l) Brokers § 22-Duties and Liabilities of Brokers-Duty of Full 
Disclosure-Mortgage Loan Broker.-A mortgage loan broker is 
customarily by a borrower to act as the borrower's agent in 
negotiating an acceptable loan. All persons engaged in this business 
are required to obtain real estate licenses. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§§ 10130 and 10131, subd. (d).) Thus, general principles of agency 
(Civ. Code, §§ 2228 and 2322, subd. (3)), combine with statutory 
duties created by the Real Estate Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10176, 
subds. (a), (i)), to impose on mortgage loan brokers an obligation to 
make a full and accurate disclosure of the terms of a loan to 
borrowers and to act always the utmost good faith toward their 
principals. A real estate licensee is charged with the duty of fullest 
disclosure of all material facts concerning the transaction that might 
affect the principal's decision. 
(2) Brokers § 22-Duties and Liabilities of Brokers-Duty of Full 
Disclosure-Breach-Mortgage Loan Brokers.-In an action by 
borrowers against a mortgage loan broker for breach of its fiduciary 
duty, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the 
broker did not satisfy its fiduciary obligations of disclosure and good 
faith in regard to a loan, where, while the borrowers did not read the 
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written loan documents before signing them, they did broker 
about the rate of interest, late payments, and the size of the baBoon 
payment due at end the loan period,. and in response to their 
questions received materially misleading and incomplete informa-
tion. 
[See Cai.Jur.3d, Brokers,§ 70; Arn.Jur.2d, Brokers,§§ 84, 85.J 
(3) Insurance Companies § 9-Agents and Brokers for lnsurer-Disclo-
sure.-Oral misrepresentations made by an agent to a policy holder 
are actionable, despite the fact that the written policy itself 
accurately discloses all terms. If the agent of the insurer undertakes 
to advise a policy holder, it is his duty to make no false or 
misleading statement in that respect. 
(4) Brokers § 22-Duties and Liabilities of Brokers--Duty of Full 
Disclosure-Mortgage Loan Brokers.-The rule that a fiduciary's 
duty may extend beyond bare written disclosure of the terms of a 
transaction to duties of oral disclosure and counseling, applies to 
transactions with mortgage loan brokers. Accordingly, where a 
husband and wife were persons of modest means and limited 
experience in financial affairs, whose equity in their home was their 
principal . asset, and who retained a mortgage loan· broker to 
negotiate for them highly complex loan terms, and where they may 
be assumed to have justifiably relied on the broker's expertise, the 
broker's failure to disclose orally the true rate of interest, the penalty 
for late payments or the swollen size of a balloon payment 
constituted a breach of the broker's fiduciary obligations. 
· (5) Brokers § 23-Duties and Liabilities of Brokers-Actions Against 
Brokers--Mortgage Loan Broker-Fraud.-In an action by bor-
rowers against a mortgage loan broker, there ·was evidence of actual 
fraud involved in the loan, where the borrowers testified that, 
mindful of late charges incurred on a prior loan, they made timely 
payment of all installments on the second loan, but the broker 
nevertheless charged the borrowers with several late charges, and 
where the broker introduced no evidence to support the contention 
that such late charges were proper. The jury could reasonably have 
inferred that the late fees were erroneously imposed and that the 
error was part of a scheme to defraud the borrowers. 
(6) Conspiracy § 12--Ch·ii-Eiements.-As long as two or more persons 
agree to perform a wrongful act, the law places civil liability for the 
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resulting damage on all of them, regardless of whether they actually 
commit the tort themselves. Accordingly, a plaintiff is entitled to 
damages from those defendants who concurred in the tortious 
scheme with knowledge of unlawful purpose. Furthermore, the 
requisite concurrence knowledge may be inferred from the 
nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interests of the 
alleged conspirators, and other circumstances. Tacit consent as well 
as express approval will suffice to hold a person liable as a 
coconspirator. 
(7) Corporations § 39-0fficers and Agents-Liability-Torts.-Direc-
tors and officers of a corporation are not rendered personally liable 
for its torts merely by reason of their official positions, but may 
become liable they directly ordered, authorized or participated in 
the tortious conduct. Personal liability, if otherwise justified, may 
rest on a conspiracy among the officers and to injure third 
parties through the corporation. 
(8) Corporations § 30-Stockhotders-Liability-Torts.---,Shareholders 
of a corporation are not normally liable for its torts, but personal 
liability may attach to them through application the "alter ego" 
doctrine, or when shareholder specifically directed or authorized 
the wrongful acts. 
(9) Conspiracy § 15-Civii-Actions-Evidence-Mortgage Loan 
Brokers--Corporations, Shareholders, Officers and Directors.-In 
an action against a mortgage loan broker, its affiliated corporations, 
their principal shareholder, and several of the corporations' officers 
and directors, alleging that the broker's misleading television 
commercials, its misrepresentations about the terms of a loan, its 
failure to can plaintiffs' to unfavorable provisions in the 
loan papers, and its of late charges on a loan despite the 
timely payment of an installments, breached the fiduciary duty owed 
to plaintiffs. the evidence was sufficient to show a conspiracy among 
all defendants. showed it was company policy to lure 
potential such as plaintiffs into their offices through 
misleading and switch" advertising, that the principal share-
holder instructed officials that late charges were a 
great source of and it was company policy that if the 
first payment was late, the rest of would automati-
cally be late. Further, knit, family oriented 
operation under personal control, 
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and was an or of 
one each was active in some 
management at some time during the years when the 
conspiracy was alleged to have occurred. Moreover, all the head-
quarters offices of the corporations were in the same building. 
(lO) Limitation of Actions § 30-Commencement of Period-Civil Con-
spiracy-Last Overt Act.-When a civil conspiracy is properly 
alleged and proved, the statute of limitations does not begin to run 
on any part of a plaintiff's claims until the "last overt act" pursuant 
to the conspiracy has been completed. Accordingly, in an action by 
borrowers against a mortgage loan broker and other related defend-
ants in which liability was premised on the theory of civil conspiracy 
through a breach of duties owed to plaintiff during the negotiation 
of a mortgage loan, the last overt act was defendants' collection a 
few weeks before trial of the final payment of the loan and, 
accordingly, the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on 
the statute of limitations. 
(11) Limitation of Actions § 3-Nature and Purpose.-Statutes of limita-
tions have, as their general purpose, to provide repose and protect 
persons against the burden of having to defend against stale claims. 
So long -as a person continues to commit wrongful acts in further-
ance of a conspiracy to harm another, he can neither claim unfair 
prejudice at the filing of a claim against him nor disturbance of any 
justifiable repose built on the passage of time. 
(12) Limitation of Actions § 57-Tolling or Suspension of Statute-
Fraud-Continuing Wrong.-When the underlying fraud a cause 
of action is a continuing wrong, a convincing rationale exists for 
delaying the running of the statute of limitations. Just as the statute 
of limitations does not run against an action based on fraud so long 
as the fraud remains concealed, so ought the statute to be tolled even 
after the fraud is discovered, for so long as the sheer economic 
duress or undue influence embedded in the fraud continues to hold 
the victim in place. 
(13) Damages § 25-Exemplary or Punitive Damages-Persons Liable-
Mortgage Loan Brokers.-Where there was substantial evidence to 
support the jury's determination that mortgage loan brokers were 
guilty of fraud when they conspired to breach their fiduciary duty 




778 WYATT v. UNION MoRTGAGE Co. 
24 Cal.3d 773: 157 Cal.Rptr. 392. 598 P.2d 45 
(14) Damages § Hi--Excessive and Inadequate Damages--Punitive 
Damages.-In an action against a mortgage loan broker, its affiliated 
corporations, their principal shareholder, and several of the corpora-
tions' officers and directors for fraud and breach of fiduciary duties 
during the negotiation of a mortgage loan, an award of $200,000 in 
punitive damages, apportioned among eight corporate and individ-
ual defendants. was not excessive, where the concealment from 
borrowers of the company policy regarding fraudulent collection of 
late charges comprised the core of defendants' wrongful conduct, 
and where plaintiffs introduced direct evidence showing that the late 
charge policy brought in millions of dollars during the years 
plaintiffs' loans were being serviced. Moreover, the structure of the 
corporations was such that the jury could reasonably infer that the 
individual defendants had personally profited from the wrongful 
conduct. The purpose of punitive damages is to penalize wrongdoers 
in a way that will deter them and others from repeating the wrongful 
conduct in the future. 
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OPINION 
BIRD, C. J.-This is ari appeal brought by a mortgage loan broker, its 
affiliated corporations, their principal and several of the 
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corporations' officers and directors from a judgment which imposed on 
them compensatory and punitive damages for breach of duties which 
were allegedly owed to respondents during the negotiation of a second 
mortgage loan. Liability of all but one of the appdlants is premised on a 
theory of civil conspiracy. Appellants contend that (1) the record discloses 
neither the breach of a duty nor the existence of a conspiracy, (2) the trial 
court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations on respondents' 
claims was tolled until the "last overt act" in the conspiracy, and (3) 
punitive damages were excessive. 
I 
Stockton Home Mortgage Company (Stockton) and Union Home 
Loans (formerly Union Mortgage Company) (Union) are affiliated 
corporations engaged in the mortgage loan brokerage business. Stockton 
operates primarily in northern California, while Union's business is 
confined to the southern part of the state. Appellant Western Computer 
Service (Western) is the servicing agent for loans negotiated by Stockton 
and Union, and appellant Secured Investment Corporation (Secured) is 
its predecessor. Appellant Irving Tushner (Tushner) is the principal and 
controlling shareholder of Stockton, Union, Western and Secured. All of 
the corporations use the business name "Union Home Loans" and are 
headquartered· at the same Los Angeles address. Appellants Esther Flink 
(Flink) and Elinore Tushner are Tushner's sister and former wife, 
respectively; each served one or more of the appellant corporations as an 
officer or director during some or all of the time described in the 
complaint. . Appellant David Marks (Marks) served as president of 
Secured and Western during a portion of the period at issue. 
The essential facts elicited at trial, viewed most favorably to respon-
dents, appear as follows: In 1966, Stockton carried on an extensive 
television advertising campaign in the Sacramento area. One frequently 
aired advertisement announced that a $1,000 loan could be paid back 
completely. principal and interest, for $!8 per month. In fact, no such 
loan was available. 
Lured by the advertising claims, respondents, Joseph and Clarice 
Wyatt, visited Stockton's Sacramento office in November 1966. They 
sought to retain Stockton's services to negotiate a second mortgage loan 
on their home for purposes of completing certain home improvements. 
(Such loans are solicited by mortgage brokers from private, noninstitu-
tional lenders.) Respondents agreed in writing to a loan negotiated by 
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Stockton gross amount $1,325 (including the brokerage fee and 
of $20 per month over 36 months (the 
orally advised respondents that a "small" 
closing charges). 









quoted a figure 
Respondents were 
Consequently, 
more than the 
due in the 37th month. (A balloon payment is 
to and interest unpaid at 
have been insufficient 
as a construction laborer, 
officer about the "grace 
that a late charge would not 
days overdue. In response to 
interest rate, the loan officer 
produced a "stack" of loan 
a promissory note, escrow 
officer leafed through the 
showing respondents where to 
out significant provisions of the written 
respondents read them carefully. The loan 
annual interest rate of !0 percent, 
delinquent payments, and 
loan balance for each 
installment). The actual 
were timely paid, 
as $950.70. However, the 
provided that installments would 
charges and interest, rather than to 
principal would thus be deferred until 
additional interest in the interim. All 
balloon ·payment. 
their payments on the 1966 loan. 
in March 1970 of $1 ,340, 
respondents asked why the 
and interest provisions of the 
Stockton refused to extend the 
were unable to find other 
they agreed to refinance the unpaid 
1970 loan) was then negotiated in 
payments of $45 per 
disclosed an estimated balance 
late 
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After repeated threats foreclosure on their home. respondents 
brought suit July 1973. Their complaint alleged. substance, that 
Stockton's misleading television commercials, its misrepresentations 
about the terms the I loan, its failure to call respondents' attention 
to the very unfavorable provisions buried in the papers, and its 
extraction of late charges on the 1970 loan despite the timely payment of 
all installments, breached the fiduciary duty which is owed by a mortgage 
loan broker to engage brokerage services. The complaint 
further alleged that the foregoing resulted from a fraudulent conspiracy 
engaged in by all the appellants. Respondents sought compensatory 
and punitive damages, and imposition of a constructive trust 
The parties to the issuance of a preliminary lllJUnction 
staying the foreclosure on respondents' residence a final deter-
mination of the action, and for so long as monthly were paid 
toward the balance claimed due. In June 1975, two weeks before trial, 
respondents, finding other financing, repaid the 1970 loan. 
To prove the of a conspiracy among the appellants, respon-
dents produced, at trial, a former employee who had prepared some of 
the advertising affiliated corporations after I 966. Confirming the 
use of the misleading television commercials in Sacramento during 1966, 
this employee testified appellant Tushner had frequently stated, in 
meetings attended by all of the other individual appellants except Flink, 
that it was company policy to purs4e late charges vigorously as a prime 
source of and that, if one payment was delinquent, an subse-
quent payments were also to be considered late. income 
figures for and Western were introduced at trial the years 
1966 through the annual amounts from approximately 
$152,000 in 1966 to over $1 million the two corporations combined in 
1971. 
The individual appellants were beyond subpoena range and declined 
to testify at triaL However, respondents read into record selected 
portions of appellants' depositions, which described the corporate posi-
tions occupied by each and their respective duties. The jury assessed 
separate awards against each appellant, totalling $25,000 in compensatory 
damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. The trial court denied 
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appellants' motion new trial after respondents consented to a 
reduction of the compensatory award to $1,000. 
II 
This court must first decide whether the jury verdict is supported by 
evidence that the appellants did in fact breach fiduciary obligations owed 
to the respondents. take the position that their duty of 
disclosure was fully met they presented to respondents written loan 
documents containing all the inform1tion required by Business and 
Professions Code section 1024l.l Appellants also claim they never 
charged respondents' account with late charges unless payments were 
actually overdue. 
(l) A mortgage loan broker is customarily retained by a borrower to 
act as the borrower's agent in negotiating an acceptable loan. All persons 
engaged in this business California are required to obtain real estate 
lkenses. (Bus. & Prof. §§ 10130 and 1, subd. (d).) Thus, 
general principles of agency (Civ. Code, §§ 2228 and 2322, subd. 3) 
combine with statutory duties created by the Real Estate Law (see Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 10176, subds. (a), (i)) to impose upon mortgage loan 
brokers an obligation to make a full and accurate disclosure of the terms 
of a loan to borrowers and to act always in the utmost good faith toward 
their principals. "The law imposes on a real estate agent 'the same 
obligation of undivided and loyalty that it imposes on a trustee in 
favor of his beneficiary.' [Citations.] This relationship not only imposes 
upon him the highest good faith toward his principal 
~ut precludes agent from obtaining any advantage over the principal 
in any transaction had by virtue of his agency. [Citation.]" (Batson v. 
Strehlow (1968) 68 Cal.2d 662, 674-675 [68 Cal.Rptr. 589, 441 P.2d 101].) 
A rea] estate licensee is "charged with the duty of fullest disclosure of all 
material facts concerning the transaction that might affect the principal's 
decision. [Citations.]" (Rattray v. Scudder (1946) 28 CaL2d 214, 223 [169 
P.2d 371, 164 A.L.R. 1356]; see also Realty Projects, Inc. v. Smith (1973) 
32 Cai.App.3d 204, 2 [ Cal.Rptr. 71]; Smith v. Zak (1971) 20 
Cal.App.3d 785, 792-793 [98 CaLRptr. 242].) 
(2) In the present case, respondents testified they did not read the 
stack of written documents before signing them in 1966. However, 
respondents the broker about the rate of interest, late payments, 
and the size of the payment due at the end of the loan period. In 
1The 1973 amendments to the Jaw on real property loans (Bus. & Prof. Code,§ 10241.1 
et seq.) are not to the case. 
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response to their questions, respondents received the materially mislead-
ing and incomplete information already described in opinion. (Ante, 
pp. 779, 780.) Given this evidence, the jury. justifiably concluded that 
Stockton did not satisfy its fiduciary obligations of disclosure and good 
faith toward its principal in regard to the 1966 loan. 
(3) In the context of insurance policies, this court has long recognized 
that oral misrepresentations made by an agent to a policyholder are 
actionable, despite the fact that the written policy itself accurately 
discloses all terms. "[IJf the agent of the insurer undertakes to advise [a 
policyholderJ, ... it should be the duty of such representative to make no 
false or misleading statement in that respect." (Glickman v. New York 
Life Ins. Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 626, 634 [107 P.2d 252, 131 A.L.R. 1292].) 
Other cases have similarly held that the existence of a confidential 
relationship may justify reliance upon oral misrepresentation of the terms 
of a contract. (See Security-First Nat. Bank v. Earp (1942) 19 Cal.2d 774, 
777 [122 P.2d 900]; Kloehn v. Prendiville (1957) 154 Cai.App.2d 156, 
161-162 [316 P.2d 17].) 
(4) There is a second reason why appellants breached their fiduciary 
obligations toward respondents. In the context of insurance policies, this 
court has recognized that a fiduciary's duty may extend beyond bare 
written disclosure of the terms of a transaction to duties of oral disclosure 
and counseling. The leading case is Raulet v. Northwestern etc. Ins. Co. 
(1910) 157 Cal. 213 [107 P. 292], where this court refused to enforce a 
clause in a fire insurance policy on furniture which voided the policy if 
the property was or became encumbered with a chattel mortgage. The 
court wrote as follows: "'It is a matter almost of common knowledge that 
a very small percentage of policy-holders are actually cognizant of the 
provisions of their policies .... The policies are prepared by the experts 
of the companies. they are highly technical in their phraseology, they are 
complicated and voluminous .... The insured usually confides implicitly 
in the agent securing the insurance, and it is only just and equitable that 
the company should be required to call specifically to the attention of the 
policy-holder such provisions as the one before us.' " (ld, at p. 230, italics 
added; see also Motor T Co. v. Great American Indem. Co. (1936) 6 
Cal.2d 439, 444 [58 P.2d 374]; Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra, 
16 Cal.2d at pp. 631-632.) 
The reasoning of these cases applies to transactions with mortgage loan 
brokers as well. Here, the record discloses that respondents were persons 
of modest means and limited experience in financial affairs, whose equity 
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in their home was their principal asset. They retained a mortgage loan 
broker to negotiate for them highly complex loan terms and they may be 
assumed to have justifiably relied on the latter's expertise. Against such a 
backdrop. the broker's failure to disclose orally the true rate of interest, 
the penalty for late payments or swollen size of the balloon payment 
clearly constituted breach of the broker's fiduciary obligations. It is 
noteworthy also that the provisions regarding interest rate, late charges 
and balloon payment were unfavorable to the borrower and yet 
the broker made no attempt to his clients' attention to these matters. 
(5) The evidence of fraud involved in the 1970 loan is a third 
reason for finding the appellants guilty of breaching their fiduciary duties. 
Respondents testified that, mindful of the late charges incurred on the 
first loan, they made timely payment of all installments until February 
1972. Thereafter, payments were made by respondents' disability insurer 
and the timeliness of those payments is not Nevertheless, 
appellants charged the Wyatt account on the 1970 with several late 
charges. At triaL they introduced no to support their 
contention that these late charges were proper. The jury once more could 
reasonably have inferred that the fees were erroneously imposed and 
that the error was part of a to defraud respondents. 
III 
Appellants next contend there 1s no substantial evidence of a 
conspiracy. stress Stockton participated in 
t.he making to Wyatts; tha-t none of them 
had knowledge of what the employees of Stockton discussed with the 
Wyatts during the loan transactions. 
Appellants mischaracterize what is necessary to support a finding of a 
civil conspiracy. (6) As long as two or more persons agree to perform a 
wrongful act. the law places civil liability for the resulting damage on all 
of them. regardless of they actually commit the tort themselves. 
(Unruh v. Truck Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 631 [102 
Cal.Rptr. 815, 498 P.2d "The effect charging ... conspiratorial 
conduct is to who agree to plan to commit the wrong 
as well as those actually carry it out. [Citations.]" ·(Black v. Sullivan 
(1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 566 [122 I 
Therefore a plaintiff is ..... ".""'"' .. "'""''~"' from those defendants who 
concurred the its unlawful purpose. 
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(Black v. Sullivan, CaLApp.3d at p. 566.) Furthermore, the 
requiSite concurrence and knowledge "'"may be inferred from the 
nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interests of the 
alleged conspirators, and other circumstances."'" (Chicago Title Ins. Co. 
v. Great Wes1ern Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 316 [70 Cai.Rptr. 
849, 444 P.2d 481].) Tacit consent as well as express approval will suffice 
to hold a person liable as a coconspirator. (Holder v. Home Sav. & Loan 
Assn. (1968) 267 Cai.App.2d 91, 108 [72 Cal.Rptr. 704].) 
(7) Directors and officers of a corporation are not rendered personally 
I;able for its torts merely because of their official positions, but may 
become liable if they directly ordered, authorized or participated in the 
tortious conduct. (United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc. 
(1970) I Cal.3d 586, 595 [83 Cal.Rptr. 418, 463 P.2d 770].) Personal 
liability, if otherwise justified, may rest upon a "conspiracy" among the 
officers and directors to injure third parties through the corporation. 
(Golden v. Anderson (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 714, 719-720 [64 Cal.Rptr. 
404]; cf. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566, 576 [108 
Cal.Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032]; Wise v. Southern Pacific Co. (1963) 223 
Cal.App.2d 50. 72 [35 Cai.Rptr. 652].) (8) Shareholders of a corpora-
tion are not normally liable for its torts, but personal liability may attach 
to them through application of the "alter ego" doctrine (see, e.g., 
Associated Vendors Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 825, 
836-837 [26 Cal.Rptr. 806]), or when the shareholder specifically directed 
or authorized the wrongful acts. 
(9) When judged against these legal standards, the record supports 
the jury verdict. First, evidence was introduced at trial to show it was 
company policy to lure potential borrowers such as respondents into their 
offices through misleading "bait arid switch" advertising. Secondly, on 
several occasions, appellant Tushner instructed other company officials 
that "late charges were a great source of income," and that "it had been a 
policy of the company that if the first payment was late, aU the rest of the 
payments would automatically be late." 
The record further discloses a tightly knit, family-oriented business 
operation under appellant Tushner's dose personal control. Tushner 
owned all or a controlling interest in each of the affiliated corporations. 
Each of the other individual appellants was an officer or director of one 
or more of the corporations and each was active in some management 
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Finally, all the headquarters offices of appellant corporations were in 
the same building. The loan papers signed by respondents .at 
Stockton's Sacramento included a deed of trust containing printed 
instructions that, when recorded, the deed should be mailed to "Union 
Home Mortgage Company." Soon after the loan papers were negotiated, 
a letter was sent to respondents on the letterhead of "Union Home 
Loans." The letter instructed respondents to mail all payments to Secured 
Investment Los Angeles. The procedure on the second 
payments were mailed to Western Computer 
From the above evidence, the jury reasonably conclude that the 
breaches of fiduciary duties owed to respondents were undertaken 
pursuant to established company policies agreed to by each .of the 
appellants. 
IV 
(10) Appellants contend that statute limitations barred respon-
dents' claims. They reason that the three-year period allowed for 
commencing actions based on fraud (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd..4) had 
passed, the complaint been filed years after the first loan and 
more than three second loan. 2 
However, the correctly noted that, when a civil conspiracy is 
properly the statute of does not begin to 
run on any part of a claims the "last overt act" pursuant to 
the conspiracy has completed. (Schessler v. Keck (1954) 125 
Cal.App.2d 827, [271 P.2d 588].) Here the "last overt act" was 
appellants' collection a few weeks before trial of the final payment on the 
1970 loan. This was culminating act in the conspiracy to defraud 
respondents with the first tortious act 1966. Therefore, the 




court repudiate the "last overt act" doctrine 
125 Cal.App.2d 827. Schessler derived the 
law regarding criminal conspiracies. However, 
because a criminal conspiracy is itself a 
2The gravamen of cause of action is that the appellants committed actual 
and constructive to breach their fiduciary duties toward the 
respondents. Therefore. of Procedure section 338, subdivision 4 states the 




punishable and continuing wrong courts stay the running of the 
statute of limitations until acts in furtherance of the conspiracy have 
ceased. This rationale, appellants conclude, is absent the case of a civil 
conspiracy, precisely because such a conspiracy is neither a punishable 
offense standing alone nor a wrong capable of supporting a cause of 
action by its own weight. 
The differences between civil and criminal conspiracies are accurately 
characterized by appellants. However, they are somewhat beside the 
point. (ll) Statutes of limitations have, as their general purpose, to 
provide repose and to protect persons ag::dnst the burden of having to 
defend against stale daims.3 (Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency (1944) 
321 U.S. 342, 348-349 [88 LEd. 788, 792-793, 64 S.Ct. 582]; Shain v. 
Sresovich (1894) 104 Cal. 402, 406 [38 P. 51 So long as a person 
continues to commit wrongful acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to harm 
another, he can neither claim unfair prejudice at the filing of a claim 
against him nor disturbance of any justifiable repose built upon the 
passage of time. 
In the present case, for instance, appellants stood accused of continuing 
their tortious conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy up until-and even 
after-the filing of the complaint. It was their own conduct that kept the 
cause of action against them alive. Therefore, no considerations of justice 
or equity require us to overrule the consistent line of cases that have 
applied the "last overt act" doctrine to civil conspiracies. (Bedolla v. 
Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 136-137 [125 Cal.Rptr. 59J; 
Kenworthy v. Brown (1967) 248 CaLApp.2d 298, 301 [56 Cal.Rptr. 461]; 
Schessler v. Keck, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d at pp. 832-833.)4 
3 Thus. the concurring and dissenting opinion misreads this court's opinion when it 
states that the majority view the statute of limitations as "intended primarily to confer 
'respose' on deserving defendants." (Cone. and dis. opn., post, at p. 797.) We give equal 
consideration above to protecting persons "against the butden of having to defend against 
stale claims." In the present case. as the concurring and dissenting opinion itself points 
out. a witness to the actual conspiracy was still available and testified at trial. 
4Contrary to the claim of the concurring and dissenting opinion (post, at p .. 795), 
acceptance of the "last overt act" doctrine does not mean accepting the view that the civil 
conspiracy is itself a tort. Instead. it is precisely because the civil conspiracy is not a ton or 
a cause of action itself that the tolling of the statute of limitations on the underlying torts 
in this case becomes relevant at all. 
Justice Richardson's reliance (post, at pp. 792, 793) on Bowman v. Wohlke (1913) 166 Cal. 
121 [135 P. 37] is also misplaced. The court there simply held that, under then existing 
statutory provisions. "causes of action for injuries to property may not be united in one 
action with causes of action for injuries to the person or character." (ld, at p. 124.) The 
coun also held that statutory rules governing pleading required causes of action united in 
one complaint to be stated separately. (!d., at p. 127.) The plaintiff had tried to avoid the 
effect of these rules by arguing that his allegations of civil conspiracy in effect created a 
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The situation of the respondents, on the other hand, demonstrates the 
equities served by the "last overt act" doctrine in cases where the fraud is 
of a continuing nature. There was substantial evidence that appellants 
were involved in perfecting a scheme whose purpose was to trap 
respondents on a financial "treadmill" from which they could not escape. 
Once trapped by the unexpectedly large balloon payment due at the end 
of the first loan, the respondents found themselves forced to refinance the 
loan, much as appellants planned. (Efforts to obtain financing from other 
sources failed.) This permitted the repetitive collection of brokerage fees 
and late charges from respondents, depletir.g their resources and moving 
foreclosure ever closer. 
(12) When, as here, the underlying fraud is a continuing wrong, a 
convincing rationale exists for delaying the running of the statute of 
limitations. Just as the statute of limitations does not run against an action 
~ased on fraud so long as the fraud remains concealed, so ought the 
statute to be tolled even after the fraud is discovered, for so long as the sheer 
economic duress or undue influence embedded in the fraud continues to hold 
the victim in place. 5 
None of the cases relied on by appellants has disapproved the holding 
in Schessler. In Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 756 [343 P.2d 118], 
plaintiff alleged a conspiracy to obstruct the orderly prosecution of her 
malpractice action. However, the face of the complaint made apparent 
.that the last fraudulent act pursuant to the conspiracy occurred more than 
three years prior to the filing of the pleading. Under these circumstances, 
the court held that defendants' motion for nonsuit was properly granted. 
Such a holding, of course, is entirely consistent with Schessler. That case 
still requires a plaintiff to allege that at least some act pursuant to the 
conspiracy was still being performed (or was only discovered) within the 
applicable statute of limitations time period. 
single cause of action. uniting all the wrongs done in furtherance of the conspiracy. (I d .• 
at p. 124.) This was the argument the court rejected in Bowman v. Wohlke. Nothing in 
today's opinion changes that result. In fact. issues concerning joinder or separate 
statement of causes of action are not germane to this case. Moreover. unlike the plaintiff 
in Bown:wn v. Wohlke, plaintiff here has never argued that civil conspiracy itself is a cause 
of action. 
"This court need not decide today the question of whether this principle would apply. 
ven if the continuing fraud were pursued by one person acting alone. (For a discussion 
f the effect that proof of undue influence or duress has on the running of the statute of 
mitations in other kinds of cases. see Developments in the Lav:--Starutes of Limitations 
950) 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177. 1219.} 
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That Schess/er Agnew v. Parks are entirely consistent was made 
clear in Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, supra, 52 Cal.App.3d at pages 136-137, 
where the court wrote: "[W]hile the cases support the proposition that a 
cause of action based on civil conspiracy accrues on the date of the 
commission of the last overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy (Schessler 
v. Keck (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 827, 832-833 ... ), it is imperative for the 
plaintiff to allege when the last overt act took place (Agnew v. Parks, 
supra)." Since over four years had lapsed between the "last overt act" of 
the conspiracy and the filing of the complaint, the Bedolla court held that 
the statute of limitations had run on the cause of action. (See also 
Kenworthy v. Brown, supra, 248 Cal.App.2d at pp. 301-303; Filice v. 
Boccardo (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 843, 846 [26 Cal. Rptr. 789]; Teitelbaum 
v. Borders (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 634, 637-638 [23 Cal.Rptr. 868].) 
Finally. it is noteworthy that many of the arguments now urged against 
the "last overt act" doctrine were presented to the Court of Appeal in 
Rodriguez v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 889 (61 
Cal.Rptr. 579]. In that case plaintiff charged defendants with conspiring 
to defame him by publishing defamatory remarks on or about October 9, 
1962, then again on October 31, 1963. Plaintiff alleged that he was 
dismissed from his employment on October 31, 1963, due to these 
defamations. He filed suit on October 13, 1964. The applicable statute of 
limitations was one year. 
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the entire complaint but the 
Court of Appeal reversed. relying on the fact that the complaint had been 
filed within one year of the "last overt act" pursuant to the alleged 
conspiracy. (!d., at pp. 893-894.) Thus, even while expressing some doubt 
about the wisdom of the Schessler case in dicta, the Rodriguez court went 
on to use the "last overt act" doctrine to judge the sufficiency of the 
plcadmg before it. 
The Rodrigue:: court specifically declined to rule on whether the statute 
of limitations barred recovering damages flowing from the earlier 
publication. finding it impossible to tell from the complaint whether the 
plaintiff meant to claim separate damages for each of the two publica-
tions. Because the Court of Appeal thus avoided this issue, the Rodriguez 
case gives little support to appellant's argument that the statute of 
limitations has run at least on the first of the two loans obtained by the 
respondents. This court is satisfied that Schessler v. Keck, supra, 125 
Cai.App 2d 827 correctly states the law ofthis state. 
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Appellants' final concern the jury's decision to award 
punitive damages. 6 Appellants first argue that the evidence was not 
sufficient to justify awarding punitive damages. Even if there was 
justification for punitive damages, appellants urge this court to find that 
the amount awarded was excessive as a matter of law. 
(13) Appellants' first argument is totally without merit. There was 
substantial evidence to support the jury's determination that the appel-
lants were guilty of fraud when they conspired to breach their fiduciary 
duty toward the respondents. Therefore, this was an entirely appropriate 
case in which to award punitive damages. Fraudulent misrepresentations 
by real estate brokers supported punitive damages in the past. (See, 
e.g., Ward v. Taggart (1 5 i CaL2d 736, [336 P.2d 534].) 
(14) Nor can court that amount damages 
was excessive as a matter a recent case makes dear, the 
purpose of punitive damages is to penaltze wrongdoers in a way that will 
deter them and others from repeating the wrongful conduct in the future. 
(Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 928, fn. 13 [148 
Cal.Rptr. 389, 582 980].) "How much" in punitive damages is 
enough to case is not susceptible 
of mathematical (1950) 35 Cal.2d 161, 164 
[217 P.2d I 
the case, concealment from borrowers the company 
policy regarding "late charges" comprised the core of appellants' 
wrongful conduct. At trial respondents introduced direct evidence 
showing that the "late charge" policy was the income-generating motor 
for Secured and Western, bringing in millions of dollars during the years 
respondents' loans were serviced by one of the two companies. 7 
The structure of the corporations was such that the jury could reasonably 
infer that the individual appellants (shareholders, officers or directors of 
6Civil Code section 3294 in pertinent part: '1WJhere the defendant has been 
guilty of oppression. fraud, or malice, express or implied. the plaintiff, in addition to the 
actual damages. may recover for the sake of example and by· way of punishing 
the defendant." 
7The parties ""~'"a"'"" 
$151,841.15 
$668.673.78 ( (1971 
Western to be as follows: $451 
$517,570.28 
-54-
income of Secured to be as follows: 
$664,409.36 (1968 ); $558,552.85 (1969): 
stipulated the "late charge" income of 
); $565,173.87 (1972): $459,984.02 (1973); 
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Secured or Western or one of affiliates) had personally profited from 
the wrongful conduct. Therefore, an award of $200,000, apportioned 
among eight corporate and individual appellants, was not excessive. 
Indeed, the trial judge, in denying appellants' motion new trial, 
thought the award showed remarkable restraint. This court agrees. The 
uncontested evidence shows that the award was much less than the 
income directly generated by appellants' wrongful conduct. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Manuel, J., and Newman, J., concurred. 
RICHARDSON, concur in the reasoning parts II and III of the 
majority opinion; I also agree that punitive damages, if properly awarded 
on all counts of the complaint, were not excessive. I I:espectfully dissent, 
however, from the judgment of affirmance, because I believe the statute 
of limitations barred much of respondents' complaint. In my view, the 
"last overt act" doctrine should not be applied in civil cases. 
As the majority concedes, the maxim that the statute of limitations on a 
"conspiracy" is tolled until commission of the "last overt act" originated 
in criminaL law, where it remains the prevailing rule. (Grunewald v. 
United States (1957) 353 U.S. 391, 396-397 [1 L.Ed.2d 931, 938-939, 77 
S.Ct. 963, 62 A.L.R.2d 1344]; People v. Zamora(l976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 548 
[134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75]; People v. Crosby (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713, 
728 [25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375 P.2d 839]; see generally, Annot. 62 A.LR.2d 
1369, 1371-1375.) Criminal conspiracy is a punishable offense separate 
from the substantive crime to the commission of which the conspirators 
have agreed. (Pen. Code, § 182.) At common law, criminal sanctions 
could be imposed even where the conspirators had taken no action to 
accomplish the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy. (See Hyde v. United 
States (1912) 225 U.S. 347, 359 [56 LEd. 1114, 1123, 32 S.Ct. 793].) 
Modern statutes require some "overt act" in furtherance of the conspir-
acy as an element of the crime (e.g., Pen. Code, § 184); the most 
frequently stated reason for this rule ts that it permits a conspirator to 
repent and withdraw from the scheme before any decisive action is taken. 
(E.g., People v. Olson (1965) 232 Cai.App.2d 480, 490 [42 CaLRptr. 760].) 
However, the substantive crime need not have been completed, nor must 
the "overt act" itself be criminal, because it is the agreement itself which 
forms the basis of prosecution. (People v. Saugstad (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 
536. 540 [21 Cal.Rptr. 740]; People v. Reed (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 395, 
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407 [ 10 Cai.Rptr. 536]: People v. Klinkenberg (1949) 90 Cai.App.2d 608, 
635-636 [204 P.2d 47, 6l3J; People v. Corica (1942) 55 Cai.App.2d 130, 134 
[130 P.2d 164J.) 
As we explained in Zamora, the "last overt act" rule in criminal 
conspiracy thus arises from an analytical focus on the continuation of the 
unla~ful agreement as a criminal offense in and of itself (18 Cal.3d at 
pp. 548-549, fn. 7.) Where the purposes of the conspiracy can be 
consummated, if at all, only by successive acts over a period of time, the 
crime of conspiracy is deemed a "continuing" one; the successive "overt 
acts" in furtherance of the unlawful agreement "mark the duration, as 
well as the scope" of the crime. (Fiswick v. Uni!ed States ( 1946) 329 U.S. 
21 J, 216 [91 L.Ed. 196,200,67 S.Ct. 224]; see Yates v. United Sraies (1957) 
354 U.S. 298,334 [I L.Ed.2d 1356, 1384,77 S.Ct. 1064].) 
Civil conspiracy, on the other hand, has experienced an entirely 
different and separate development. (de Vries v. Brumback (1960) 53 
Cal.2d 643, 649-650 [2 Cal.Rptr. 764, 349 P.2d 532].) The gist of an action 
charging civil conspiracy is not the agreement itself, but the damage 
suffered as the result of a tort or torts committed in furtherance of the 
joint design. No conspiracy, however atrocious, gives rise to any civil 
cause of action unless an underlying civil wrong, resulting in damage, is 
alleged and proven. (Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 
616, 631 {102 Cal.Rptr. 815, 498 P.2d 1063]; Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. 
Great Western Financial Corp. ( 1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 316 [70 Cal.Rptr. 
849, 444 P.2d 481]; Orlo.ffv. Metropolitan Trusl Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 484, 
488 [110 P.2d 396].) Allegations of conspiracy add nothing whatever that 
i's substantive to a civil complaint; their only purpose is to permit joinder 
as defendants of all parties who agreed to the tort, regardless of whether 
they directly participated in its commission. (Mox incorporated v. Woods 
(1927) 202 Cal. 675, 677-678 [262 P. 302]; Wise v. Southern Pacific Co. 
(1963) 223 CaLApp.2d 50, 64 [35 Cal.Rptr. 652J.) The applicable statute 
of limitations for a civil conspiracy is that for the underlying tort. 
(Kenworthy v. Brown (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 298, 301 [56 Cal.Rptr. 461]; 
Agnew v. Parks (1959) I72 Cal.App.2d 756, 765 [343 .P.2d 118].) 
These long established principles were applied by us in Bowman v. 
Wohlke (19!3) 166 Cal. 121 [ 135 P. 37], to prevent the improper inclusion 
of separate torts in a single complaint under a "conspiracy" theory. 
There, plaintiffs joined claims for injury to person, property, and 
reputation, then generally not permitted under former Code of Civil 
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Procedure section 427. see Code Civ. 427.10.) When 
defendants verdict and denial of their new motion on 
ffs asserted that such claims could 
the various torts alleged had been committed pursuant 
to a them. 
We rejected that view. has been said," we ''that 'the 
allegation and proofs of a conspiracy in an action of character is [sic] 
only important to connect a defendant with a transaction and to charge 
him with the ... cts and declarations of his co-conspirators, where otherwise 
he could not have been implicated.' (Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N.Y. 454, 
... See, also, 8 Doremus v. Hennessey, 62 391.) The 
effect of this doctrine in so far as the case us IS 
concerned is clear. The complaint alleged various causes of action for 
different torts. all committed, it is true. in of a single 
conspiracy. but each, nevertheless, giving rise to a cause of 
action for the injury caused the particular wrongful act. Whether or 
not the various causes of action could properly be united depended on 
our statutes relating to the joinder of causes of action in one complaint." 
(P. 126.) 
Bowman thus represents this court's dear view, not heretofore repu-
diated, that allegations of civil "conspiracy" do not change the legal 
nature and effect causes action for the separate underlying torts. 
Nonetheless, the majority, in a footnote, dismisses Bowman as inapposite. 
Rather, it relies upon a Court of Appeal decision, v. Keck 
(1954) 125 827 I P.2d 588]. There, sued three 
defendants for remarks allegedly made by them over a period 
of several years. She asserted that the remarks were part of a conspiracy 
to injure her in her one of the had occurred 
withm the one-year normally applicable to defamation 
actions. (Code Civ. subd. 3.) The two defendants to whom 
the earlier statements were attributed successfully demurred on grounds 
of the statute. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissaL 
Citing People v. Hess (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 642 [234 P.2d 65], a 
criminal case, as its sole primary authority, the Schessler court concluded 
that the wnspiracy allegations permitted suit against aU defendants on an 
publications, since the statute did not begin to run on any of the torts 
until there was "a cessation of the wrongful acts committed in furtherance 
of the conspiracy." (l25 Cal.App.2d at p. 832.) This doctrine has 
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-57-
794 WYATI v. UNION MoRTGAGE Co. 
24 Cal.3d 773: 157 Cal.Rptr. 392. 598 P.2d 45 
concededly been acknowledged in a number of subsequent California 
appellate decisions. (E.g., Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 
118, 136 [125 Cal.Rptr. 59] [finding "last overt act" occurred outside 
limitation period]; Kenworthy v. Brown, supra, 248 Cal.App.2d 298, 302 
[same]; see Filice v. Boccardo (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 843, 846 [26 
Cai.Rptr. 789].) 
Recognizing the confusion and potential abuse inherent in the 
Schess!er rule, however, other districts of the Court of Appeal have 
resisted its full implications. In Agnew v. Parks, supra, 172 Cal.App.2d 
756, for example, it was held that, despite allegations of "conspir~cy," the 
statute of limitations runs separately on each "separate, distinct and 
complete" act which violates the rights of another. Schessler was not 
mentioned. (P. 765.) 
·As the majority indicates, Agnew found plaintiff's claim barred 
because her complaint revealed that the last "fraudulent" act therein 
alleged had occurred more than three y'ears before suit was commenced. 
(P. 766.) Read in context, however, this holding only reaffirms the 
unassailable principle that an action for fraud, even if joined with 
conspiracy claims, must be filed within three years after the act 
constituting "fraud" takes place. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 4.) 
Agnew does not support a rule that commencement of the statute of 
limitations for all tortious acts in a conspiracy is blindly deferred until 
commission of the last "overt" act in the conspiracy. 
More recently, in Rodriguez v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1967) 
252 Cal.App.2d 889 [61 Cal.Rptr. 579], another conspiracy case involving 
multiple slander, the court applied the "last overt act" rule at the 
pleading stage, but only because it concluded that the complaint 
essentially sought damages only for the most recent, still timely publica-
tion. Significantly, and voicing its doubts, the Rodriguez court observed: 
"We have not been cited any case, nor has our research produced one, in 
which one overt act committed within the statutory period and one prior 
thereto executed in pursuance of a conspiracy, have been considered in 
relation to the statute of limitations, except Schessler v. Keck, supra, and 
in that case the issue is not clear-cut .... [~] If ... plaintiff were to ... 
seek recovery [for damages] ... resulting from separate and completed 
acts of slander committed before the statutory period, it is doubtful that 
the action as to such acts and damages could escape the bar of the statute 
of !imitations." (Pp. 893-894.) 
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The majority suggests that appellants' acts may be linked by the 
conspiracy into a "continuing wrong," thereby tolling the statute of 
limitations until appellants' tortious conduct finally ceased. For several 
reasons, I disagree. 
First, the majority's proposal ignores the well settled principle, 
discussed above, that the focus of a civil conspiracy action is indeed upon 
the separate torts, not the "continuing" nature of th~ scheme itself. 
Despite the majority's protestations to the contrary, acceptance of any 
"last oven act" rule amounts to a concession that the continuing unlawful 
scheme is in itself a tort. This is clearly not the law (Bowman v. Wohlke, 
supra, 166 CaL 121, 126), and the majority errs in characterizing the fraud 
as "a continuing wrong" (ante, pp. 787-788). Rather, there were several, 
separate, successive tortious acts, each one independently actionable. 
Second, contrary to the majority's suggestion, a "continuing wrong" 
doctrine is not justified by the equitable considerations raised in its 
defense. Rules in this area seek to balance "the practical purposes that a 
statute of limitations serves in our legal system"-i.e., avoidance of stale 
and open-ended claims-against "the practical needs of prospective 
plaintiffs"-i.e., preservation of an effective remedy for wrongful con-
duct. (Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 512 [121 Cal.Rptr. 705, 535 
P.2d 1161, 79 A.L.R.3d 807].) Accordingly, the law has developed 
numerous general safeguards, applicable to "conspiratorial" and "non-
conspiratorial" torts alike, to assure that the strong public policies 
represented by the statute of limitations do not foreclose a plaintiff's 
remedy for wrongs committed against him. For example, the statute of 
limitations on any claim is deferred until a cause of action has "accrued." 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 312.) This occurs, at the earliest, when some "actual 
and appreciable damage" has resulted from a defendant's wrongful act. 
(Davies v. Krasna, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 513-514; Buddv. Nixen (1971) 6 
Cal.3d 195, 200 [98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433].) Moreover, in 
appropriate cases, "accrual" may be further delayed until actual or 
constructive discovery of the claim (e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 338, subd. 4 
[fraud], 340.5 [medical malpractice]; Nee! v. Magana, Olney, Levy, 
Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 194 [98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 
421] [legal malpractice]; Coots v. Southern Pacific Co. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 
805, 810 [322 P.2d 460J progressive industrial condition leading to 
disability; statute commences when disability occurs]; Avner v. Longridge 
Eswtes (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 607,616 [77 Cal.Rptr. 633] latent defects in 
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subdivision lot]: Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co. (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 330, 
348 [68 Cal.Rptr. 617] [latent product defect].) 
Each of these doctrines deals directly with the "practical problems of 
prospective plaintiffs" in asserting an effective remedy for damage 
wrongfully caused by another. They ensure that the limitations period 
will not run before an injured party has had a realistic opportunity to sue. 
In contrast, the "last overt act" doctrine operates mechanically, without 
reference to plaintiff's diligence, affording plaintiff the bonanza of a 
tolled statute for torts upon which he long since could have commenced 
suit 
Indeed, the majority so applies the rule here. Apparently' conceding 
respondents' Apri/1970 discovery of appellants' previous tortious conduct, 
the majority would nonetheless toll the statute in spite of full discovery so 
long as unsophisticated plaintiffs continue to suffer the effects of the 
. fraud. (Ante, pp. 787-788.) For obvious reasons, this novel theory is clearly 
contrary to prior California law, as the majority elsewhere (ante, pp. 788, 
789) acknowledges (Davies v. Krasno., supra, 14 CaL3d 502, 514; Teitel-
baum v. Borders (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 634, 637-638 [23 Cal.Rptr. 868]), 
and notions of fundamental fairness do not compel its adoption. 
Discovery of a cause of action necessarily implies the ability to act in 
vindication of one's legal rights. (See, e.g., Sanche:: v. South Hoover 
Ho!.pital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 101-103! 132 Cai.Rptr. 657. 553 P.2d I 129].) 
The most fundamental difficulty with the "last overt act" rule, of 
course, is its fortuitous and random inequity. Where a single defendant is 
involved, plaintiff may clearly not avoid the statute of limitations on an 
earlier tort by waiting to commence suit until further tortious acts of the 
defendant have produced even greater damage. (Davies v. Krasna, supra, 
14 Cal.3d at pp. 512-515.) There appears absolutely no reason why a 
different rule should apply simply because two or more persons "con-
spired" to commit the identical wrongs. On policy grounds plaintiffs 
should be encouraged to nip "conspiracies" in the bud. The "last overt 
act" rule applied to civil wrongs, on the other hand, encourages injured 
parties to sit by until the conspiratorial scheme has operated with full 
force and has run its extended ultimate course. The statute of limitations 
on each of the precedent causes of action which have fully accrued is 
meanwhile suspended in midair, as it were. Such a rule makes no sense, 
and defeats the purposes of the statute of limitations while serving no 
legitimate needs of injured plaintiffs. 
(Aug. 1979] 
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Contrary to the majority's suggestion the statute of limitations is not 
intended primarily to confer "repose" on deserving defendants. Its most 
important function. one the majority declines to analyze, is to avoid the 
problems of proof inherent in actions based o·n incidents long past. 
(Dal'ies v. Krasna, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 512; Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 
Cal.3d 410.417 [115 Cal.Rptr. 641,525 P.2d 81.71 A.L.R.3d 839].) By the 
time this action was filed in July 1973, acts occurring seven years before 
may well have receded in the memories of available witnesses. In fact, 
only one witness to the actual conspiracy was presented at triaL The 
instant case thus illustrates. rather than refutes, the need for certitude in 
the application of a statute of limitations. 
It has been said that the numerous decisions of other jurisdictions on 
this issue present "a melange of inconsistent, irreconcilable, even 
contradictory statements of general 'rules' relating to the subject." 
(Annnt 62 A.L.R.2d 1369. 1385.) My examination of these authorities 
fails to per~uade me of the: efficacy of a "last overt act" rule. The better 
reasoned view, I think, is that which is expressed in Universal Film 
Exchange~ v. Swanson (D.Minn. 1958) 165 F.Supp. 95. There, the court 
succinctly repudiated the notion that separate torts may be "welded" into 
a single claim under the "hammer" of conspiracy allegations. (P. 98.) 
l therefore reject the majority's conclusion that the statute of limita-
tions for separate tortious acts committed pursuant to a civil "conspiracy" 
is tolled until the "last overt act" in the conspiracy. Rather, the limitations 
period should be deemed to commence for each underlying tort when, a 
known injury to plaintiff occurring, a cause of action has "accrued" 
thereon according to the rules normally applicable, and in no event later 
than plaintiffs' discovery of grounds for a cause of action. I would, 
accordingly. cling 10 our earlier Bowman rationale and disapprove 
Schessler v. Keck, surra. to the extent that it conflicts with these views. 
Since the evidence before us would justify a finding that causes of 
action based on the 1966 loan "accrued" and were discovered no later 
than April 1970, more than three years prior to suit, appellants were 
entitled to instructions on the statute of limitations as to those claims. On 
the other hand, respondents' claims that late charges were improperly 
extracted on the 1970 loan appear to have been asserted in timely fashion. 
Discovery and damage with respect to these fraudulent acts could not 
have ari~en until March or April 1973. when plaintiffs were again faced 
li\11~ 19791 
-61-
798 WYATI v. UNION MoRTGAGE Co. 
24 Cal.3d 773; 157 Cal.Rptr. 392. 598 P.2d 45 
with an unexpectedly high balloon payment. Suit was filed within three to 
four months thereafter. Accordingly, as a matter of law, this latter claim is 
not barred. 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Clark, J .. concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied September 12, 1979. 




§ 335. of limitation 
Pi:RIODS OF LIMITATION PRESCRmED. 
the commencement of actions 
property, are as follows: 
OODE PROCEDURE EXHIBIT C 
llalllllty, neeptlon; tre•pan or l11jury te realty; 
Wlthln three fesl.nl: 
or chattel!>; fruil or mistake; INnd 
allildiUoul time, maximum limit; alan· 
1. AD action upon a Uli.I»Uty created by statute, other tban a penalty or for-
feiture. 
2. AD' aetloo for ~ upon or l.njuey to fl:lSl property . 
.8. AD action for ~. detaining, or l.njunng any goods, or cllattels, includln&' 
~for the llqleclfie reeovery of peri!IOnal property. 
4. An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. '!'be caWJe of action 
Ia web CIUle oot to be deemed to have acerued until the dii!ICOvery, by the aggrieved 
party, of tbe facts coru~Ututlng the fraud or mistake. 
IS. AD action upon a bond of a public official except uy eaw.e of action bued on 
fraud or embezzlement is not to be deemed to have acerued until the discovery, b::V 
the agrleved party or bls agent, of tbe facts coru~tltutlng said earu~e of action 
upon tbe bond. 
8. AD lllctlon qaiut a ootlllry public on his bond or ill bis official capacity e:r· 
cept that uy cause of sctlou based 011 malfe~~J~&nce or mlafeaaance is not deemed 
to have accrued until by the aggrieved part)' or bls aaent. of the facts 
conltitutiDg said cau~~e of provided, tbat any action baaed on malfeasance 
or misfeua:oce shall be commenced witbln one year from dii!ICOvery, b::v the a&· 
crieved party or bls agent, of the facts COil!!titUtlllg said eause of action or witbln 
1lmle ;rears from the performuce of tbe :ootlllrial act giving rise to said action, 
whichever is later; ud provided further, that uy action agaiut a notary public 
on hia bond or 1n bla official eapactty must be commenced wltbln Bl:r years. 
7. AD action for slander of title to real property. 
8. AD action commenced under Section 11536 of the BnsiDeu ud Profeuloru~ 
Code. The cause of action in auch ease shall not be deemed to have accrued until 
the discovery by tbe agrleved party, the Attorney General, the district attorney, 
the county couWJel, tbe clty prosecutor, or tbe clty attorney of the facts constltutiDg 
pounds for commencing such an action. 
(Amended by 8tats.1957, e. 649, p. 1849, § 1; 8tats.1972, c. 823, p. 1470, 1 2.) 
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october 21, 1980 
EXHIBIT D 
MEMORANDUM TO ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
REGARDING FORMER AB 2382 AMENDMENTS 
(To Change Statute of Limitations in Civil 
cases Where There is Continuing Wrongdoing) 
The Union Home Loan Amendments contain two sections 
that ar~ designed to overturn and change well established law 
in the State. Since 1954, 26 years ago, at least six different 
Appellate Courts, and the Supreme Court in Wyatt v. Union 
Home Loans (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, have carefully considered 
the concept involved and upheld it despite all the arguements 
raised by various interests probably including the same argu-
ments that are being raised before the legislature at this 
time. 
These amendments although appearing to be innocu-
ous, actually are very dangerous for the people of this State. 
The present rule established by Schessler v. Keck (1954), 125 
Cal.App.2d 827, states that where a cont1nu1ng course of 
wrongdoing whether it be fraud, negligence, intentional 
interference with contractural relationship, medical malpractice, 
legal malpractice, or any other kind of wrongdoing, which 
extends over a period of years, longer than the statute of 
limitations for any single wrongful act, where there is a 
scheme by two or more persons to join forces in the form of 
a civil conspiracy, then the statute of limitations on any 
wrongful act pursuant to this scheme or plan does not begin 
to run until the last act of the conspiracy. This of course 
makes great sense and six Appellate Courts (18 judges and 
their law clerks) as well as the Supreme Court have carefully 
considered this concept and have approved it. The Third 
District Court of Appeal did so in the ~att case in an 
opinion written by former State Senator Edward Regan. 
1. These amendments seek to throw all this out 
and establish a very dangerous rule because this is how it 
would normally work. Despite the fact for example in a 
serious case of fraud involving home loans that are refinanced 
every few years, the borrower must file suit even though 
there is a threatening lien upon his home after he discovers 
he was victimized and he must file suit within three years of 
the discovery of the facts even though he is still subject 
to the continuing fraud and is very vulnerable. People in 
this state are reluctant to incur unknown risks in going to 
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Court, particularly where they are dealing with a big financial 
organization. This applies as well to attorneys and many, many 
suits that should be brought aren't because of the public's 
worry about legal and entanglements, and they just pay 
up and suffer. 
2. Another bad aspect of these amendments are 
that after the first suit is filed, additional lawsuits would 
have to be filed to cover each of the subsequent tortious 
wrongs resulting in Court time waste, multiplicity of suits 
and further expense to all parties. 
3. As soon as anyone filed suit against a lender 
particularly, they would report the borrowers to the various 
credit agencies resulting most likely in credit being cut-off 
often resulting in the borrower being turned down for a new 
loan to pay off the fraudulent one borrower could claim 
they were taken advantage of but credit agencies tend to 
take the position that they would put an explanation in the 
file, but the explanation would not be complete until after 
the suit went to trial and so serious credit damage could 
easily occur. 
The argument the bill involves something that 
constitutes a logical The present law has been 
the law of s state 1954, the same arguments have 
been used many Court briefs and rejected, and 
we are all aware that an extreme argument can be made when 
in fact it never occurs. The proposed amendments to the 
law would cause individuals in this state to suffer at the 
hands of commercial interests that would take advantage of 
the law by deliberately committing wrongs knowing that they 
could get away with most them after three years had gone 
by in fraud cases and such conduct of course should not be 
permitted at any time. 
Sincerely yours, 
Irvine P. Dungan 
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APPENDIX A 
BEFORE THE ASSEUBLY C011!-1ITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
ON THE Il.fi'ORTANCE OR 1-iA.INTAINING THE 
CURRENT RULE FOR THE RUNNING OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIUITATIONS IN ACTIONS IN 
WHICH CIVIL CONSPIRACY HAS BEEN 
ALLEGED AND PROVED 
OCTOBER 23, 1980 
I~. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name 
is Kate Doyle. I am an attorney in the Legal Serivces Unit of 
the Division of Consumer Services, California Department of 
Consumer Affairs, and am testifying for our Department. 
Initially, it should be noted that in Wyatt v. Union 
Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 157 Cal.Rptr. 392, the California 
Supreme Court did not establish the rule that in those cases 
where civil conspiracy has been alleged, the statute of limitations 
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for the underlying tort does not begin to run until the last 
overt act pursuant to the conspiracy has been completed. This 
rule has been applied in civil conspiracy cases by the appellate 
courts of our state for over 20 years. 
From a policy perspective, the full import of a scheme 
that may be injurious to the consumer may not be recognized 
by the consumer until such time as the last overt act necessary 
to complete the scheme has taken place. In the Wyatt case 
the fraud included inducing consumers to make contracts on the 
basis of misrepresentations in advertising, and then bringing 
pressure to bear to keep the consumer indebted for long periods 
of time with ever-increasing balances upon which more and more 
interest could be charged. This was accomplished through the 
device of refinancing when the consumer could not meet the 
payments he had anticipated \'Vould be collected. Indeed in 
Wyatt until the consumers were threatened with foreclosure 
proceedings against their home, the full import and effect 
of the scheme was not recognized. It was only at this point 
that they took legal action. This is not an unusual pattern. 
As in Wyatt, many consumers will refinance an agreement 
even when perhaps they should realize that misrepresentations 
have been made. They usually do not know the law or see 
themselves as having any meaningful alternatives to refinancing. 
Until the consumer realizes that the "friendly financier" is 
indeed going to foreclose,the consumer is often not on notice 
or sufficiently alarmed to seek professional legal advice. 
Prior to that point, the consumer will have been presented with 
-67-
-3-
many confusing and difficult documents to sign with an 
accompanying soothing, encouraging and often untruthful explanation 
of what the forms mean. 
As long as the consumer listens to what is said and 
does not or cannot read and understand the documents he or she 
is signing, and as long as threat of loss to the consumer is 
not apparent to him or her, the consumer can very easily be 
led for some time even in the face of information which could 
be argued as having put him or her "on notice" of a fraud. 
Consumers are all too frequently intimidated by business persons 
with whom they are dealing, and many persons feel obliged 
to pay their debts without complaint, even when they have good 
reason to believe they have not been dealt with fairly, as 
was certainly the case in Wyatt. 
The fact pattern in the Nyatt case is in some respects 
a prototype for business practices which are not as uncomnon as 
we would all like to believe. The Department of Consuoer 
Affairs recently litigated a case regarding a scheme in 
which a finance company encouraged consumers who were obligees 
of retail installment sales contracts regulated by the Unruh Act 
to "flip" or change the agreements into personal loans. These 
new financing agreements changed the statutory regulation of 
the contracts such that a statute with fewer consumer protective 
provisions and a higher interest rate provision would apply 
to the agreements. Very few consumers would be likely to 
discover that this had taken place. If they did discover that the 
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new contracts were regulated by different statutes from those 
regulating retail installment sales contracts, the ramifications 
of those differences might not become apparent to them until 
such time as the creditor attempted to repossess security 
triggering the consumer to see an attorney. 
Recent press coverage of home equity schemes and 
lien contract schemes in Los Angeles further highlight the 
unfortunate fact that not all business persons deal fairly with 
consumers. Such schemes also highlight the ease with which 
the consuming public can be defrauded and the slowness with 
which many such persons seek the assistance of an attorney even 
when aware that something may not be quite fair about the 
contract upon which they are now indebted. 
It should also be kept in mind that access to legal 
services for low income persons is in short supply, and that for 
the lower middle to middle income person such access often requires 
a substantial outlay of funds. Consumers will not seek legal 
help until some severe threat is made. 
For all of these policy reasons, permitting the 
statute of limitations to run from the date of the last 
overt act pursuant to the conspiracy, a time which realistically 
is more likely to coincide with the event which brings home to the 
consumer his or her potential injury resulting from the frauq 
is clearly the better rule. The purpose of statutes of 
limitations is to prevent the pursuit of stale claims. Until 
the last overt act necessary to complete a conspiracy to defraud 




For these reasons the Department Consumer Affairs 
s that the California Supreme Court correctly applied 
the law in ruling that the statute of limitations runs fro~ 
the date of the last overt act necessary to complete the 
conspiracy when civil conspiracy has been alleged, particularly 
in consumer fraud cases, and that the long standing and prevailing 
rule on this subject should not be changed. 
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